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ABSTRACT
In this article, we discuss what we consider to be the ten important
and influential biotechnology patent law judicial decisions of 2018. These
hinged on a variety of patent doctrines. An abbreviated new drug
application (ANDA) for the multiple sclerosis drug Ampyra set the stage
for the Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc. (Fed. Cir.
2018) decision, in which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Federal Circuit) provided guidance on how to conduct an obviousness
analysis (35 U.S.C. §103). The Berkheimer v. HP Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
decision, although addressing a software invention, provided valuable
insight into how to determine if inventions fall within patent-eligible
subject matter (35 U.S.C. §101). Widely-anticipated by the branded and
generic pharmaceutical industries, sovereign Native American nations,
and consumers alike, the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018) decision held that tribal sovereign
immunity could not be used to shield patents covering the drug Restasis
in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding before the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB). In Regents of the University of California v.
Broad Institute, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018), the Federal Circuit found there to
be no interference-in-fact between patents and patent applications
covering CRISPR gene editing owned by the Broad Institute and the
University of California. The United States Supreme Court (Supreme
Court), in Oil States Energy Services, LLC. v. Greene’s Energy Group,
LLC (2018), held that IPR proceedings violate neither Article III nor the
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, and, in SAS
Institute Inc. v. Iancu (2018), further elaborated the law of IPRs by
requiring the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to
produce a final written decision (FWD) on all claims challenged by a
petitioner in an IPR petition. How to apply the written description
requirement (35 U.S.C. §112) to patent claims covering monoclonal
antibodies, as well as the requirements for granting a permanent
injunction against infringing medicines or other therapeutic agents, were
both the subject of the decision in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi (Fed. Cir. 2017).
The Supreme Court gave its first interpretation of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) for the approval of biosimilar
drugs in Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc. (2017), addressing, among other
things, the disclosure and information exchange provisions of the statute,
commonly known as the “patent dance” over Sandoz’ biosimilar of
Amgen’s biologic, Neupogen. In contrast to cases where the Supreme
Court deigned to act, the Court decided not to act in Regeneron
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Pharmaceuticals v. Merus (2018), denying a petition for certiorari to
consider the law of inequitable conduct. In a decision of considerable
importance, the Supreme Court considered, in Life Techs. Corp. v.
Promega Corp. (2017), whether the supply of a single component, Taq
polymerase, of a multi-component toolkit for genetic testing by DNA
amplification, for combination abroad, violates 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1),
reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision that it does, and remanding the
case for further proceedings. Biotechnology patent law evolved in 2018
across a number of frontiers, and will certainly continue its doctrinal
evolution in 2019.

I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2018 was a busy and exciting one for biotechnology patent
law. The ownership odyssey of patents claiming mammalian
CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing—perhaps the most important biotechnology
innovation since the polymerase chain reaction (PCR)—was finally tested
in Federal court. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit) turned a distinctly cold shoulder to the Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe’s invocation of tribal sovereign immunity to prevent inter partes
review (IPR) of its drug patents. And the United States Supreme Court
(Supreme Court) offered its views on the constitutional legitimacy of
IPRs. In this article, we present a top ten list of the most important 2018
developments in biotechnology patent law. These top ten decisions offer
insights about both the current and future state of biotechnology patent
law. 1
Admittedly, choosing the top ten judicial decisions suffers from an
inevitable degree of subjectivity. However, we believe these decisions are
among the most important decisions of the year in biotechnology patent
law even if others might prefer to substitute a case or two for those on our
list. Eight of the top ten decisions discussed in this article were delivered
during the 2018 calendar year. Two constitute temporal anomalies, having
been decided by the Supreme Court in 2017 but are included because of
their great importance to biotechnology patent law.
We discuss the top ten biotechnology patent decisions below.
These decisions are not presented in any particular order. After
consideration of individual judicial decisions, we conclude by suggesting
1. Much of the discussion of biotechnology law cases in this article is adapted, with full
permission, from case summaries written by Dr. Kevin E. Noonan on his leading biotechnology patent
law blog, www.PatentDocs.org.
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what prospective impact these decisions may have on biotechnology
patent law.
II. THE 2018 TOP TEN IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW
A.

Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc. (Fed. Cir.
2018) (Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, Dyk, and Taranto; opinion
by Judge Taranto; dissenting opinion by Judge Newman).

Determining obviousness is always a reconstruction, imperfectly
done, of a past that never was. The prior art is consulted and the question
asked: Would a worker of ordinary skill in the art have been able to
achieve the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success?
Of course, this question is posed against a backdrop of the ordinarily
skilled worker not having achieved the invention; that accomplishment
was attained by the actual inventor(s). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court,
since Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 2 and the Patent Act, since 1952, 3 have
recognized that sometimes the answer to the question must be no, if only
to ensure satisfaction of the constitutional mandate that Congress only
grant patents that will “promote the progress of . . . [the] useful arts.” 4
In patent litigation, defendants have ample motivation to cast the
imperfect past in a light most favorable to the claimed invention being
obvious. To balance the rhetorical scales, defendants also bear the burden
of establishing obviousness (as in all invalidity pleadings) by clear and
convincing evidence. But what is clear and convincing to some is not to
others, and the Federal Circuit’s split decision affirming the district
court’s obviousness determination in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane
Labs., Inc. illustrates that point, while at the same time showing that even
the objective indicia of nonobviousness identified by the Supreme Court
in Graham v. John Deere 5 do not always provide a reliable, fact- and
historically based shield against a finding of obviousness. 6

2. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851).
3. 35 U.S.C. §103 (2017) (“[A] claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that
the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between
the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in
which the invention was made.”).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
6. See generally Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
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The lawsuit arose when Roxane Laboratories and co-defendants
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. each
filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for Acorda’s
multiple sclerosis drug Ampyra and sent Paragraph IV letters to Acorda
(and co-plaintiff Alkermes Pharma Ireland Ltd.) asserting that four
Orange Book-listed patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 8,007,826; 8,663,685;
8,354,437; and 8,440,703) were invalid. 7 As the Federal Circuit panel
stated, there was one additional patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,540,938, owned
by Elan Corp. Plc and exclusively licensed to Acorda. 8 That patent
broadly claimed therapeutic formulations of 4-aminopyridine (4-AP),
while Acorda’s patents were for narrower formulations having specific
characteristics and properties that distinguished (undisputedly, for novelty
purposes) these claims from the claims of the ‘938 patent. 9
For the purposes of the appeal, all the asserted claims recited
methods, dosing regimens, and sustained-release formulations for
methods of administering to a patient with multiple sclerosis a sustainedrelease 4-AP formulation “(1) in a 10 mg dose twice a day (2) at that stable
dose for the entire treatment period of at least two weeks (3) to achieve 4AP serum levels of 15–35 ng/ml and (4) to improve walking.” 10 The
parties treated the following claims as representative:
Asserted claim seven (dependent from claim six) of the ‘826 patent:
6. A dosing regimen method for providing a 4-aminopyridine at a
therapeutically effective concentration in order to improve walking in a
human with multiple sclerosis in need thereof, said method comprising:
initiating administration of 4-aminopyridine by orally
administering to said human a sustained release composition of 10
milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily for a day without a prior
period of 4-aminopyridine titration, and then,
maintaining administration of 4-aminopyridine by orally
administering to said human a sustained release composition of 10
milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily; without a subsequent period
of 4-aminopyridine titration,
whereby an in vivo CmaxSS:CminSS ratio of 1.0 to 3.5 and a CavSS of
15 ng/ml to 35 ng/ml are maintained in the human.

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 1313.
Id.
Id.
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1313.
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7. The method of claim 6, whereby an increase in walking speed is
obtained in said human.11
Asserted claim twenty-two of the ‘437 patent (dependent from claim
eighteen, which depends on claim one):
A method of increasing walking speed in a human multiple sclerosis
patient in need thereof comprising orally administering to said
patient a sustained release composition of 10 milligrams of 4aminopyridine twice daily for a time period of at least two weeks,
wherein said 10 milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily are the
only doses of 4-aminopyridine administered to said patient during
said time period.
...
18. The method of claim 1[,] wherein said sustained release
composition is a tablet.
...
22. The method of claim 18[,] wherein said tablet exhibits a release
profile to obtain a CavSS of about 15 ng/ml to about 35 ng/ml.12

In the ensuing ANDA litigation,, the defendants stipulated to their
infringement, but counterclaimed that all claims at issue were invalid for
obviousness. 13 The district court found the ‘826, ‘685, ‘437, and ‘703
patents (but not the ‘938 patent) obvious and entered final judgment and
an injunction that precluded final approval by the FDA of defendants’
ANDAs until July 20, 2018 (the expiration date of the ‘938 patent). 14 This
appeal ensued.
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Taranto joined
by Judge Dyk; Judge Newman dissented vigorously. 15 The opinion set
forth the extensive prior art asserted against Acorda’s claims, evidence
that Elan had tried (and failed) to produce a suitable 4-AP formulation,
and evidence that Sanofi had also attempted making such a formulation
without success. 16 Distinctions from the prior art included the need to
titrate the dose of 4-AP, which (as the opinion concedes) had a “narrow
11. U.S. Patent No. 8,007,826 col. 27 ll. 41–59 (filed Dec. 13, 2004).
12. U.S. Patent No. 8,354,437 col. 28 ll. 55–57 (filed Apr. 8, 2005).
13. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., No. 14-882-LPS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48479, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2017), aff’d, 903 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
14. Id. at *199. The district court found the ‘938 patent not invalid and infringed, judgments
not appealed to the Federal Circuit.
15. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d 1310.
16. Id.
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toxic-to-therapeutic range.” 17 Also, the opinion noted variable reports of
4-AP efficacy and frequent reports of serious side effects (including
seizures) from 4-AP administration in the prior art, and that Acorda’s
methods, administration regimens, and sustained-release formulations
were the only ones the FDA approved to improve walking speed in
multiple sclerosis patients. 18
Nevertheless, the majority affirmed based on finding the salient
limitations (set forth above and numbered (1) through (4)) recited in the
prior art, and that the skilled worker would have had a reasonable
expectation of success in achieving the claimed invention in view of this
extensive art. 19 The majority rejected Acorda’s three contentions: “that
the district court erred in finding that a person of skill would have had a
motivation to combine the prior art to arrive at the Acorda invention and
a reasonable expectation of success in doing so”; “that the claim
limitations relating to pharmacokinetics—i.e., achieving 4-AP serum
levels of 15–35 ng/ml— are inherent in the claimed invention and
therefore obvious”; and “that the court improperly applied a categorical
rule that a blocking patent (the Elan patent) negates any findings in favor
of Acorda on the objective indicia of commercial success, failure of
others, and long felt but unmet need.” 20 While it may appear to some that
the majority appears to have cherry-picked the prior art and reconstructed
the invention using the claims as a roadmap (illustrating why the Supreme
Court might have underestimated the pernicious effects of hindsight in
obviousness determinations in KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex. Inc. 21), it is the
majority’s rejection of Acorda’s third argument that makes this decision
noteworthy.
The majority’s consideration of the so-called “secondary
considerations” (otherwise termed the objective indicia of
nonobviousness) is grounded in the question of whether the ‘938 patent is
a “blocking patent” that itself provides the basis for the commercial
success of Acorda’s Ampyra drug product (rather than any purported
nonobviousness of the claimed invention). 22 The commercial success
objective indication of nonobviousness requires a nexus between the
success and the claimed invention; frequently, such assertions are
rebutted, inter alia, by a patentee’s market power or other alternative
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1316–17.
Id. at 1314–18.
See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. , 903 F.3d at 1335.
Id. at 1328.
See generally KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1336–37.
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explanation for commercial success. 23 The majority opinion sets forth the
court’s precedent based on rebuttal of an assertion of commercial success
as a basis for nonobviousness in Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc., Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., and Merck Sharp
& Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc. 24 In each case, the court held that the
asserted commercial success did not support nonobviousness due to the
existence of another patent not at issue in the litigation that explained why
others had not marketed a competing product. 25 Specifically, the majority
noted that in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc. (Merck II) that
“a blocking patent did not, all by itself, justify discounting evidence of
commercial success, “calling it a “fact-specific inquiry.” 26 The court
understood Merck II’s reasoning to reflect a common-sense recognition
that, as a theoretical matter, a blocking patent may or may not deter
innovation in the blocked space by commercially motivated potential
innovators other than the owners or licensees of the blocking patent.
Where the owner of the blocking patent or exclusive licensee is different
from the owner of the patent in suit, the granting of a license may be a
realistic possibility. Even where, as here, the owner of the patent-in-suit
and the exclusive licensee of the blocking patent are the same, a potential
innovator might or might not think it could successfully challenge the
blocking patent. Such a potential innovator might or might not be willing
to do research in the blocked space without a license to a blocking
patent—even if the research itself is within the safe harbor provided by 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)—and wait until the potential inventor has already
developed and patented an aimed-at improvement to negotiate for a crosslicense with the blocking patent’s owner to share the profits from the
improvement. 27 Besides the assessment of whether the blocking patent

23. Id. at 1337.
24. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. , 903 F.3d at 1337–38 (citing Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d
731 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 874 F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1338 (citing Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 874 F.3d at 730).
27. The United States Code gives the definition of infringement:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United
States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug
or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2010)
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can be successfully challenged, a number of other variables appear to the
Federal Circuit majority generally relevant to this calculus, including the
following:
the costliness of the project; the risk of research failure; the nature of
improvements that might arise from the project, and whether such
improvements will be entirely covered by the blocking patent; the size
of the market opportunities anticipated for such improvements; the costs
of arriving at the improvements and getting them to market; the risk of
losing the invention race to a blocking-patent owner or licensee; the risk
that the blocking-patent owner (making its own economic calculations,
perhaps in light of its own other products or research activities) will
altogether refuse to grant a license to the improvement or will demand
so large a share of profits that the whole project is not worthwhile for
the potential innovator—all evaluated in light of other investment
opportunities. 28

Taking these factors and the prior art into consideration (including
the fact that Acorda had been given an exclusive license to Elan’s ‘938
patent), the majority held that the district court had not erred in its
analysis, given the deference due to the district court on the factual
question of commercial success. 29 The same blocking effect was also fatal
(to the panel majority) to the assertion of “long-felt need” and “failure of
others” as objective indicia of nonobviousness. 30
Not so for Judge Newman, whose dissent illustrates the pitfalls that
exist in any obviousness determination. 31 Judge Newman considered
exactly the same prior art and evidence that convinced the majority, and
it convinced her of their error. 32 To Judge Newman, the history of the prior
art was one of failure of many others to achieve the claimed invention.33
She deemed the “new legal theory” regarding the almost plenary effect of
blocking patents on the objective indicia not just inimical to the patentee,
but also to “the afflicted public,” who would have lost the opportunity for
Ampyra to have been developed if, in prescient retrospect, Acorda had
foreseen the majority’s outcome. 34 Judge Newman cited the prior art as
showing “decades of failure” to wrestle this unwieldy drug, with its

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1338.
See id. at 1332.
Id. at 1341.
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. , 903 F.3d. at 1342 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1342–43.
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1342–43.
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“narrow toxic-to-therapeutic range[]” associated with unpredictable and
severe side-effects, to the reliable therapeutic uses achieved by Acorda:
The record shows that many scientists in many institutions studied and
eventually abandoned 4-AP as a treatment prospect for multiple
sclerosis. These abandoned studies constitute the prior art on which the
district court and my colleagues rely for obviousness of the Acorda
Patents. However, the experimentation with 4-AP shows just the
opposite – it shows that work with 4-AP was abandoned due to the
inability to balance the compound’s potential effectiveness with its
toxicity. 35

Over and over, through her litany of the prior art, she showed that the
majority used prior art to support obviousness that revealed a failure to
achieve the therapeutic goals without risking (and incurring) serious side
effects. 36 Judge Newman set forth instances where the majority apparently
ignored or downplayed evidence that prior art upon which their decision
relied reported abandonment of research and development efforts on 4AP due to “toxicity and seizures,” encephalopathy, hepatitis, or
“dizziness, hypotension, or nausea” that accompanied the drug’s use. 37
The record shows that even Acorda, like all the other researchers, initially
failed to develop a sustained release formulation and administration
regimen effective at improving walking speed in multiple sclerosis
patients, and that it was only when Acorda achieved an “analytical
breakthrough” (i.e., a reevaluation of the clinical data) that its Ampyra
product was successfully developed. 38
In addition, with regard to the majority’s base determination of
obviousness, Judge Newman asserted that:
[T]he question is not whether these four elements [as set forth above], if
combined, would produce a successful treatment. The question is
whether the prior art contains a suggestion or motivation to select these
four elements from the decades of inconclusive prior art, with a
reasonable expectation that the selection would eliminate the failures of
the prior art. 39

35. Id. at 1343.
36. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. , 903 F.3d. at 1342–54 (Newman, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1347–50.
38. See id. at 1349–50.
39. Id. (citing In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent
Litigation, 676 F.3d 1063, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); Kevin E. Noonan, In re Cyclobenzaprine
Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation (Fed. Cir. 2012), PATENT DOCS (May 9,
2012), https://www.patentdocs.org/2012/05/in-re-cyclobenzaprine-hydrochloride-extended-releasecapsule-patent-litigation-fed-cir-2012.html [https://perma.cc/7NUN-FSSX].

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 2

648

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:637

For Judge Newman, “[t]he years of studies and failures weigh heavily
against the simplistic post hoc predictability accepted by the court.” 40
Judge Newman found no basis for the majority’s determination that the
skilled worker would have had a reasoned basis from the art to make the
selections Acorda did nor any reasonable expectation of success if the
skilled worker had done so:
Acorda is correct that there was no suggestion in the prior art that the
claimed combination should be tried, and there is no hint of a reasonable
expectation of success. Acorda points to the decades of failure of others
to develop a safe and effective treatment for multiple sclerosis using 4AP, despite its known toxicity. The district court’s selection of separate
limitations from separate sources, and retrospectively fitting them into
the Acorda template, is achieved only with the hindsight knowledge of
Acorda’s eventual success. Here, only the Acorda Patents teach the
combination that successfully treats this multiple sclerosis impairment
while avoiding toxicity and seizures. 41

And with regard to commercial success, Judge Newman’s analysis
provides a compelling argument that the district court and the majority
made the wrong comparison in deciding that Elan’s blocking patent was
relevant to the question:
Commercial success is measured against the products available for the
same purpose, not against infringing copies of the patented product.
Defendants do not contend that they are precluded from providing or
developing other treatments for multiple sclerosis. The Acorda product
met a long-felt need, for which the failure of others, despite decades of
experimenting with the neurological properties of 4-AP, is evidence of
the unobviousness of the Acorda achievement. Such evidence is an
important aid to a court that is attempting to divine whether the
patentee’s discovery was obvious in accordance with law. 42

For good measure, Judge Newman ended her dissent by noting:
The district court was advised that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
sustained the validity of the Acorda Patents in inter partes review, at
Coalition for Affordable Drugs (ADROCA), LLC v. Acorda
Therapeutics, Inc. . . . . Although the majority reports this event, as did

40. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1350 (Newman, J., dissenting).
41. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d. at 1352–53 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also SanofiSynthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The determination of obviousness
is made with respect to the subject matter as a whole, not separate pieces of the claim.”).
42. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1353 (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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the district court, its consequences are not explored, including issues of
privity, estoppel, and finality. 43

B.

Berkheimer v. HP Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Panel: Circuit Judges
Moore, Taranto, and Stoll; Opinion by Judge Moore).

This case arose from a patent infringement complaint by sole
inventor Steven E. Berkheimer against HP alleging infringement of U.S.
Patent No. 7,447,713. 44 HP moved for summary judgment under § 101 on
claims construed by the district court in a Markman hearing, which the
court granted, and this appeal followed. 45
The ‘713 patent is directed to “digitally processing and archiving
files in a digital asset management system” which “parses files into
multiple objects and tags the objects to create relationships between
them,” then compares these objects to “archived objects to determine
whether variations exist based on predetermined standards and rules.” 46
The claimed method “eliminates redundant storage of common text and
graphical elements, which improves system operating efficiency and
reduces storage costs.” 47 Claims one and four of the ‘713 patent recite:
1. A method of archiving an item comprising in a computer processing
system:
presenting the item to a parser;
parsing the item into a plurality of multi-part object structures
wherein portions of the structures have searchable information tags
associated therewith;
evaluating the object structures in accordance with object structures
previously stored in an archive;
presenting an evaluated object structure for manual reconciliation
at least where there is a predetermined variance between the object and
at least one of a predetermined standard and a user defined rule. 48
...

43. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d. at 1354 (Newman, J., dissenting).
44. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018); U.S. Patent No. 7,447,713
(filed Oct. 15, 2001).
45. Id. at 1362–63.
46. Id. at 1362.
47. Id. at 1362–63.
48. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366.
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4. The method as in claim 1 which includes storing a reconciled object
structure in the archive without substantial redundancy. 49

The district court’s decision granting summary judgment of patent
ineligibility was grounded in the Supreme Court’s Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l precedent, which set forth a two-part test to determine whether
claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. 50 In the
first prong of the test, a court must decide whether a claim is directed to
one of the judicial exceptions (laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas). 51 If so, then the court must further decide under the second
prong of the Alice/Mayo test whether any element or combination of
elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to
significantly more than the judicial exception. 52 Several Federal Circuit
cases have established that generic computer implementation of an
otherwise abstract process does not qualify as “significantly more,” but a
claimed improvement to a computer or technological process can be
patent-eligible. 53
Regarding its § 101 analysis, the district court found that claim 1
satisfied the first prong of the Alice/Mayo test, being directed to “the
abstract idea of ‘using a generic computer to collect, organize, compare,
and present data for reconciliation prior to archiving.’” 54 The Federal
Circuit agreed, holding that “claims 1-3 and 9 are directed to the abstract
idea of parsing and comparing data; claim 4 is directed to the abstract idea
of parsing, comparing, and storing data; and claims 5-7 are directed to the
abstract idea of parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data.” 55 The court
found analogies between Berkheimer’s claims and those of In re TLI
Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig. and Content Extraction & Transmission
LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n., where claims directed to
obtaining, processing, and storing data were found to be abstract. 56 The
court rejected Berkheimer’s argument that the claims were not abstract
because “the ‘parsing’ limitation roots the claims in technology and
transforms the data structure from source code to object code,” saying
49. Id. at 1370; U.S. Patent No. 7,447,713 col. 47 ll. 8–30 (filed Oct. 15, 2001).
50. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 218 (2014).
51. Id. at 217.
52. Id. at 217–18; Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
88 (2012).
53. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S at 225–26.
54. Id. at 1366.
55. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366.
56. Id. at 1366–67 (citing In re TLI Comm’s LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
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“[t]hat the parser transforms data from source to object code does not
demonstrate non-abstractness without evidence that this transformation
improves computer functionality in some way.” 57
Turning to the second prong of the § 101 inquiry, the court reiterated
that “[t]he second step of the Alice/Mayo test is satisfied when the claim
limitations ‘involve more than performance of well-understood, routine,
and conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” 58 But the
court then set forth its novel appreciation of how courts should apply the
Alice/Mayo test that makes this case noteworthy:
The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is
well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the
relevant field is a question of fact. Any fact, such as this one, that is
pertinent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. Like indefiniteness, enablement, or obviousness,
whether a claim recites patent eligible subject matter is a question of law
which may contain underlying facts. 59

The panel found support for its interpretation in Accenture Global
Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., as well as Justice Breyer’s
statement from Mayo v. Prometheus, that the § 101 inquiry may overlap
with fact-sensitive inquiries such as that for novelty under § 102. 60 This
fact-based inquiry will not necessarily arise in every patent-eligibility
challenge; some § 101 disputes may be resolved as a matter of law when
there is no material issue of fact regarding whether one or more claim
elements or combination thereof is well-understood, routine, or
conventional to a person of ordinary skill in the art. 61 Applying these
principles to the case at bar, the court stated:
While patent eligibility is ultimately a question of law, the district court
erred in concluding there are no underlying factual questions to the §
101 inquiry. Whether something is well-understood, routine, and
conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual
determination. Whether a particular technology is well-understood,
routine, and conventional goes beyond what was simply known in the
prior art. The mere fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior

57. Id. at 1367.
58. Id. (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 225 (2014).
59. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368 (emphasis added).
60. Id.; see generally Accenture Glob. Servs. GMBH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 691 F. Supp.
2d 577 (D. Del. 2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
61. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368.
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art, for example, does not mean it was well-understood, routine, and
conventional. 62

This reasoning implicates a distinction between whether a technology is
“known” in the sense of § 102 (e.g., publicly available) and whether one
of ordinary skill would find this technology to be well-understood,
routine, and conventional (e.g., something that this person of ordinary
skill would consider to be textbook knowledge or part of his or her
ordinary course of activities). 63
Despite enunciating this new interpretation of the Alice/Mayo test,
the court concluded that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept
beyond that of the abstract idea therein. 64 On the other hand, the Court
held that claims 4 through 7 recite “limitations directed to the arguably
unconventional inventive concept described in the specification . . . that
storing object structures in the archive without substantial redundancy
improves system operating efficiency and reduces storage costs.” 65 This
raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding these claims (i.e.,
“whether claims 4-7 archive documents in an inventive manner that
improves these aspects of the disclosed archival system”). 66 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit remanded the matter to the district court to make such
a determination. 67
Prior to this decision, district courts considered questions of patent
eligibility under § 101 as pure questions of law, typically on motions to
dismiss early in litigation, and frequently without requiring claim
construction on that basis. Part of these proceedings have been otherwiseunsubstantiated allegations that claim elements considered under the
second prong of the Alice/Mayo test were “well-understood, routine, and
conventional” without requiring any evidence to support the allegations. 68
Courts have not supported patentees’ supplications that evidence was
required for this prong. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent
Office) has taken a similar stance: there has been little support for the
notion that an examiner need supply facts in support of bald allegations
of conventionality (albeit typically in the face of disclosure in the
specification that supports the examiner’s position). This decision
provides a basis for patentees and forewarned patent applicants to
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1369.
See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369.
Id.
Id. at 1370.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
See generally Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
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challenge these broad statements of conventionality, and, at a minimum,
get around presumptive decisions by courts and the Patent Office that
have heretofore precluded the opportunity to address the factual
underpinnings vel non of such arguments contrary to patent eligibility.
C.

Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (Panel: Circuit Judges Dyk, Moore, and Reyna; Opinion
by Judge Moore; concurring opinion by Judge Dyk).

In St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB) of the Patent Office that tribal immunity could not be used to
shield patents in IPR proceedings by denying the St. Regis Mohawk
Tribe’s motion to terminate Mylan’s IPR proceedings on these grounds. 69
The issue arose in IPR Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128,
IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, and IPR2016-01132
(and parallel IPRs filed by Petitioners Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
and Akorn, Inc., which had been joined with Mylan’s IPRs), instituted
against U.S. Patent Nos. 8,685,930, 8,629,111, 8,642,556, 8,633,162,
8,648,048, and 9,248,191, respectively. 70 After the PTAB instituted IPRs
against these six patents owned by Allergan, and directed to its Restasis
product, Allergan assigned its rights in the patents to the St. Regis
Mohawk Tribe (Tribe) in return for a license. 71 The Tribe argued
unsuccessfully before the PTAB that, as the Tribe was the rightful owner
of the patents, the PTAB lost jurisdiction based on tribal sovereign
immunity. 72 The PTAB held that, as an issue of first impression, the Tribe
had not borne its burden of showing it was entitled to the requested relief,
and that the nature of the license left all substantive patent rights with

69. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
70. U.S. Patent No. 8,685,930 (filed Aug. 7, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,629,111 (filed Aug. 14,
2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,642,556 (filed Aug. 14, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,633,162 (filed Aug. 14,
2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,648,048 (filed Aug. 14, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 9,248,191 (filed Mar. 21,
2014).
71. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2016–01127, 5–6 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23,
2018); Kevin E. Noonan, Allergan Avails Itself of Sovereign Immunity, PATENT DOCS (Sept. 13,
2017),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/09/allergan-avails-itself-of-sovereign-immunity.html
[https://perma.cc/TV8F-VBSK].
72. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2016–01127, 18 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23,
2018); Kevin E. Noonan, Mohawk Nation Exercises Sovereign Immunity in Inter Partes Review,
PATENT DOCS (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/09/mohawk-nation-exercisessovereign-immunity-in-inter-partes-review.html [https://perma.cc/JQ8U-CNVA].
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Allergan, which company could thus amply represent the Tribe’s rights,
even in its absence. 73
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Moore. 74 The
opinion acknowledged the existence of tribal sovereign immunity
affirmed by the Supreme Court, as described in the Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez 75 and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, judicial decisions 76 but that this immunity
“does not extend to actions brought by the federal government.” 77 In
particular, tribal sovereign immunity “does not apply where the federal
government acting through an agency engages in an investigative action
or pursues an adjudicatory agency action.” 78 However, this exception to
tribal sovereign immunity does not constitute a blanket rule regarding the
application of tribal sovereign immunity. 79
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority (FMC) 80 formed the basis of the
panel’s decision. This is appropriate seeing as the Tribe had itself cited
this case to support its sovereign immunity assertion (even though that
case involved state, not tribal, sovereign immunity). 81 The panel drew its
distinction on the basis that it considered IPRs to be more akin to federal
administrative proceedings (in which the federal government is the
“superior sovereign,” and tribal immunity does not apply) than these
proceedings are to a dispute between private parties, in which a
government agency plays an adjudicatory role (as in the FMC
precedent). 82 The opinion distinguished IPRs from the circumstances in
FMC based on the hybrid nature of IPRs, as the Supreme Court
characterized these proceedings in Cuozzo Speed Technologies., LLC v.
73. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2016–01127, (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23,
2018); Kevin E. Noonan, PTAB Denies St. Regis Mohawk Tribe’s Motion to Terminate IPRs based
on Sovereign Immunity, PATENT DOCS (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/02/ptabdenies-st-regis-mohawk-tribes-motion-to-terminate-iprs-based-on-sovereign-immunity.html
[https://perma.cc/S3FJ-PFFT.]
74. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1324.
75. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
76. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
77. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1325 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Housing
Authority, 260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,
827 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1987)).
78. Id. (citing Pauma v. NLRB, 888 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2018), and Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 122 (1960); Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir.
2001).
79. Id. (citing Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754–56 (2002)).
80. FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754–56 (2002).
81. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1326.
82. Id.
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Lee. 83 The Federal Circuit’s opinion further relied upon the Supreme
Court’s continuation of its explication of the nature of IPRs in its two
recent decisions on these proceedings, Oil States Energy Services v.
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC and SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu. 84 Under
these precedents, the panel concluded that there were sufficient
similarities between IPRs and administrative agency proceedings (here,
wherein the Patent Office reconsiders the propriety of granting the
challenged patents) and sufficient differences from more adjudicatory
proceedings (including the broad and complete discretion vested in the
Director of the Patent Office on whether to institute an IPR, the absence
of any requirement that either party continue to participate once an IPR
has been instituted, and procedural differences relating to, inter alia,
evidentiary and discovery rules) for tribal sovereign immunity not to
apply. 85 The “government’s central role” in IPRs and the Director’s
unreviewable discretion (rather than the insistence of a private party) in
deciding whether to institute IPR proceedings were considerations leading
to the panel’s conclusion that an “IPR is more like an agency enforcement
action than a civil suit brought by a private party,” and tribal sovereign
immunity could not shield the Tribe from the IPRs. 86 The opinion notes
that the Director is politically accountable, sub silentio, acknowledging
the public policy aspects of the question, both in controlling increased
drug prices and in the ability of Native American tribes to participate in
facets of the economy outside casinos and tourism. 87
Also relevant to the panel’s opinion is the capacity of the PTAB to
continue IPRs after institution even if the petitioner (as in Cuozzo) or
patent holder declines to participate. 88 Finally, substantial differences in
procedure between IPRs and district court litigation (wherein similarities
between administrative agency action and district court litigation was
used to support tribal sovereign immunity in FMC) was another basis for
the Federal Circuit’s opinion. 89
The opinion avoided Mylan’s other arguments, including that the
assignment and re-licensing of these patents was a sham, intended by the
parties to avoid reexamination of these patents, that would thwart
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1326–27.
85. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1327.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., IPR2017-00572, 2 (P.T.A.B. July 13,
2017).
89. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1328 (“An IPR hearing is nothing like a district
court patent trial.”).
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congressional goals of improving patent quality via IPRs that provide a
means to invalidate improvidently granted patents. 90 The panel also
pointedly stated that its decision was limited to tribal sovereign immunity,
and that the Court “leave[s] for another day” the question of whether
States can assert their Eleventh Amendment immunity against IPR
proceedings (which the court is scheduled to hear in the upcoming
Ericsson v. University of Minnesota appeal). 91
Judge Dyk wrote a concurring opinion, expressing his views that the
history of reexamination proceedings before the Patent Office was
consistent with the panel’s decision to uphold the PTAB’s refusal to
recognize tribal sovereign immunity in this case. 92
The Tribe thereafter filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court, 93 which the Court denied. 94
D.

Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute, Inc. (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Schall and
Moore; Opinion by Judge Moore).

In Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute, Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB in an appeal of the CRISPR 95
interference. 96 Because the Federal Circuit did not rehear this decision en
banc (and the parties did not petition the Supreme Court for certiorari),
the interference between the Broad Institute (Broad) and the University of
California/Berkeley (UC) is now concluded. 97 The court affirmed the
PTAB’s decision 98 that there is no interference-in-fact between Broad’s
90. Id.
91. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1329.
92. Id. at 1329–35 (Dyk, J., concurring).
93. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe. et al. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., et al., US__ (No. 18-899).
94. Kevin E. Noonan, Supreme Court Denied Certiorari Writ by St. Regis Mohawk Indian
Tribe in Restatis® IPR, PATENT DOCS (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/04/
supreme-court-denied-certiorari-writ-by-st-regis-mohawk-indian-tribe-in-restatis-ipr.html.
95. CRISPR is an acronym for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats”. In
the context of “gene editing”, CRISPR often functions in conjunction with Cas9 (“CRISPR-associated
protein 9”), and the combination of the two is also known as “CRISPR-Cas9.” There are other
CRISPR-associated proteins in addition to type “9”.
96. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
97. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1297.
98. Id. at 1289; Kevin E. Noonan, PTAB Decides CRISPR Interference—No interference-infact, PATENT DOCS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/02/ptab-decides-crisprinterference-no-interference-in-fact.html [https://perma.cc/HX9Y-NFRR]; Kevin E. Noonan, PTAB
Decides CRISPR Interference in Favor of Broad Institute—Their Reasoning, PATENT DOCS (Feb. 16,
2017),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/02/ptab-decides-crispr-interference-in-favor-of-broadinstitute-their-reasoning.html [https://perma.cc/4959-PNPJ].
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twelve patents 99 and one application-in-interference and UC’s pending
patent application. 100
To recap, the PTAB found that there was no interference-in-fact based
on these requirements: In this proceeding, to prevail on its argument that
there is no interference, Broad must show that the parties’ claims do not
meet at least one of the following two conditions:
1.

that, if considered to be prior art to UC’s claims, Broad’s
involved claims would not anticipate or render obvious UC’s
involved claims, or

2.

that, if considered to be prior art to Broad’s claims, UC’s
involved claims would not anticipate or render obvious Broad’s
claims.

Broad will prevail and a determination of no interference-in-fact will be
made if a preponderance of the evidence indicates one of these
conditions is not met. 101

In considering the evidence before it, the PTAB gave great weight to
contemporaneous, cautious statements in the art regarding whether the
system would work in eukaryotic cells in view of inventor Doudna’s
disclosure of in vitro CRISPR activity. 102 Specifically, these statements
convinced the PTAB that while the results “suggested the ‘exciting
possibility’” that CRISPR could be operative in eukaryotic cells: “it was
not known whether such a bacterial system would function in eukaryotic
cells” 103 and “[i]n another report, Doudna was quoted as stating that she
had experienced ‘many frustrations’ getting CRISPR to work in human
cells and that she knew that if she succeeded, CRISPR would be ‘a
profound discovery.’” 104 UC’s assertion of other statements by their
inventors that could be interpreted more positively did not convince the
PTAB that there was a reasonable expectation of success in the art for
getting CRISPR to work in eukaryotic cells, 105 with the PTAB stating
“[a]lthough the statements express an eagerness to learn the results of
99. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1289–90 (citing U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (filed
Oct. 15, 2013) as being representative).
100. Id. at 1289.
101. Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 9 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017),
https://e-foia.uspto.gov/Foia/RetrievePdf?system=BPAI&flNm=fd106048-02-15-2017-1
[https://perma.cc/3T6M-6HQL].
102. Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 21 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1293.
103. Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 14 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id.
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experiments in eukaryotic cells and the importance of such results, none
of them express an expectation that such results would be successful.” 106
The PTAB swept aside UC’s arguments that this reasoning was
flawed because the standard is not the inventor’s expectations, but those
of the worker of ordinary skill. The PTAB stated that “if the inventors
themselves were uncertain, it seems that ordinarily skilled artisans would
have been even more uncertain.” 107 The PTAB also quoted UC’s expert
as having said (contemporaneously with Professor Doudna’s report of in
vitro CRISPR activity): “[t]here is no guarantee that [CRISPR] will work
effectively on a chromatin target or that the required DNA-RNA hybrid
can be stabilized in that context.” 108 The PTAB concluded that “[w]e fail
to see how ‘no guarantee’ indicates an expectation of success.” 109
Nor was the PTAB convinced based on the history of the
development of CRISPR technology, which showed that many
laboratories independent of the Doudna group quickly applied the new
technology to manipulate eukaryotic cell genomic DNA 110:
Regardless of how many groups achieved success in eukaryotic cells,
we are not persuaded that such success indicates there was an
expectation of success before the results from these experiments were
known. The unpublished results of research groups are not necessarily
an indication of whether ordinarily skilled artisans would have expected
the results achieved. Instead of viewing such work as evidence of an
expectation of success, we consider the number of groups who
attempted to use CRISPR-Cas9 in eukaryotic cells to be evidence of the
motivation to do so, an issue that is not in dispute. We agree with
Broad’s argument that a large reward might motivate persons to try an
experiment even if the likelihood of success is very low. 111

The PTAB found that this evidence further supported its decision that
there was insufficient evidence of a reasonable expectation of success to
support UC’s allegation that their earlier work and publications would
have rendered Broad’s invention obvious. 112 This evidence was that
“differences in gene expression, protein folding, cellular
compartmentalization, chromatin structure, cellular nucleases,
intracellular temperature, intracellular ion concentrations, intracellular

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 17 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24.
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pH, and the types of molecules in prokaryotic versus eukaryotic cells
would contribute to this unpredictability [regarding whether the CRISPRCas9 system would be operative in eukaryotic cells].” 113 In response to
UC’s allegations that these considerations turned out not to be an
impediment to CRISPR’s activity in eukaryotic cells, the PTAB said
“[t]he relevant question before us is whether those of skill in the art would
have expected there to be problems before the experiments were done,”
not whether it turned out that the experiments were successful once they
were tried. 114
Finally, the PTAB rejected UC’s citation of other prokaryotic genetic
modification systems found to work in eukaryotes, finding that there was
no commonality in these methods that would have refuted Broad’s
evidence that the skilled worker would not have had any reasonable
expectation of success. 115
UC appealed, and on September 10, 2018, the Federal Circuit
affirmed in an opinion by Judge Moore, joined by Chief Judge Prost and
Judge Schall. 116 After providing a description of CRISPR 117, and outlining
substantive and procedural issues that had been before the PTAB, the
court addressed the legal arguments proffered by UC in support of its
argument against the PTAB’s decision of no interference-in-fact. 118 As
stated in the opinion,
This case turns in its entirety on the substantial evidence standard. The
[PTAB] found a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a
reasonable expectation of success in applying the CRISPR-Cas9 system
in eukaryotic cells. . . . Given the mixture of evidence in the record, we
hold that substantial evidence supports the [PTAB]’s finding that there
was not a reasonable expectation of success, and we affirm. 119

The opinion then addressed UC’s two arguments aimed at refuting
the PTAB’s decision, “that the [PTAB]: (1) improperly adopted a rigid
test for obviousness that required the prior art contain specific
instructions, and (2) erred in dismissing evidence of simultaneous

113. Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 29-30 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15,
2017).
114. Id. at 32.
115. Id. at 39.
116. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
117. See generally Kevin E. Noonan, CRISPR Interference Declared, PATENT DOCS (Jan. 28,
2016),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2016/01/crispr-interference-declared.html
[https://perma.cc/MNK6-DEVY].
118. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1292.
119. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1291.
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invention as irrelevant.” 120 The court based its opinion on the evidence
presented by one of Broad’s experts with regard to the difference between
prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells (a distinction Broad recited extensively)
“that rendered the application of the CRISPR-Cas9 system in eukaryotic
cells unpredictable.” 121 These differences raised issues relevant to
whether the skilled worker would have had a reasonable expectation of
success in applying CRISPR to eukaryotic cells, and were also, according
to the opinion, recognized by UC’s expert, including inter alia statements
such as, “[t]here is no guarantee that Cas9 will work effectively on a
chromatin target or that the required DNA-RNA hybrid can be stabilized
in that context” and “whether the CRISPR-Cas9 system will work in
eukaryotes ‘remains to be seen’ and ‘[o]nly attempts to apply the system
in eukaryotes will address these concerns.’” 122 This evidence was
supported, in the panel’s opinion, by UC’s own inventors (including
Jennifer Doudna), “acknowledging doubts and frustrations about
engineering CRISPR-Cas9 systems to function in eukaryotic cells and
noting the significance of Broad’s success.” 123 In addition, the court noted
evidence that other prokaryotic systems adapted to eukaryotic cells
(“riboswitches, ribozyme systems, and group II introns”) “either [had]
limited efficacy or the technology required a specific strategy to adapt it
for use in eukaryotic cells.” 124 According to the court, this amounted to
substantial evidence that the skilled worker would not have had a
reasonable expectation of success in achieving CRISPR in eukaryotic
cells. 125 The opinion recognized that UC had presented evidence in
support of its position, but noted “[w]e are, however, an appellate body.
We do not reweigh the evidence. It is not our role to ask whether
substantial evidence supports fact-findings not made by the [PTAB], but
instead whether such evidence supports the findings that were in fact
made.” 126
The opinion also rejected UC’s arguments that the PTAB had used a
rigid test that required specific instructions in the prior art, and ignored
the “inferences and creative steps” recognized as being relevant to an
obviousness determination under the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 127 With regard to “simultaneous invention”
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 1292.
Id.
Id. at 1293.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1293.
Id. at 1294.
Id.
Id. (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 420 (2007)).
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evidence (which UC argued the PTAB ignored), the opinion states that
while “[s]imultaneous invention may serve as evidence of obviousness
when considered in light of all of the circumstances,” 128 the existence of
interferences means that simultaneous invention cannot, by itself, be
evidence of obviousness. 129 The Federal Circuit rejected UC’s argument
that evidence that six independent research groups applied CRISPR to
eukaryotic cells “within a short period of time” after publication of its
discovery on prokaryotes rendered Broad’s claims obvious, and approved
the legal rationale used by the PTAB: 130
The [PTAB] explained that “[e]ach case s particular context, including
the characteristics of the science or technology, its state of advance, the
nature of the known choices, the specificity or generality of the prior art,
and the predictability of results in the area of interest.” . . . (quoting
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). We
do not see any error in this analysis. 131

An important consequence of this decision is that the status quo will
remain unchanged: Broad will maintain its extensive CRISPR patent
portfolio and UC’s patent application (reciting claims broader than
Broad’s and encompassing CRISPR without regard to the cells in which
it is practiced) will have been granted by the Patent Office as a patent in
due course. 132 Under these circumstances, a third party wishing to practice
the technology in eukaryotic cells (encompassing everything from yeast
to humans) would need a license from both UC and Broad (absent the
parties coming to an agreement on how their overlapping technologies
will be licensed). This situation of blocking patents could hinder
commercial adoption of powerful new gene editing techniques. However,
the prospect of holding back such a revolutionary and potentially
beneficial new biotechnology should provide further impetus for some
sort of co-licensing agreement between the parties to be forged.
E.

Oil States Energy Services, LLC. v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC
(2018) (Opinion of the Court by Justice Thomas, joined by Justices
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan;
concurring opinion by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg

128. Id. at 1295 (citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730
F.2d 1452, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
129. Id.
130. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1296.
131. Id.
132. U.S. Patent No. 10,266,850; see, Kevin E Noonan, Another U.S. Patent Issued for CRISPR
(Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/04/another-us-patent-issued-for-crispr.html.
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and Sotomayor; dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts).
On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court held in Oil States Energy
Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC that IPR proceedings
violate neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment of the
Constitution. 133 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, explained that a
grant of a patent is a matter involving a public right, not a private right,
and falls within the public rights doctrine as involving the same
considerations involved in a grant of a patent. 134 The majority noted that
“[p]atent claims are granted subject to the qualification that the [Patent
Office] has ‘the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent
claim’ in an inter partes review” and this removes any constitutional
infirmity for an Article I court (the PTAB) relieving a patentee of an
improvidently granted patent right. 135 The majority opinion and the
dissent both based their decisions on McCormick Harvesting Machine v.
Aultman. 136 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent relied upon the broad language of
that case that “[t]he only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to
annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of
the United States, and not in the department which issued the patent.” 137
However, the majority pointed out that this is “best read as a description
of the statutory scheme that existed at that time,” and did not address
whether Congress had authority to establish an entirely different
scheme 138 (which it has done repeatedly since 1980 with passage of the
amendment to the Patent Act authorizing ex parte reexamination). 139 In
fact, before the 1870 change to the patent statute discussed in that case,
Congress provided examiners with absolute discretion to cancel any
reintroduced original claim in a reissue proceeding. 140 Congress withdrew
this grant of authority before McCormick Harvesting, which made the
Patent Office’s cancellation of original claims in reissue proceedings a
violation of due process and an invasion on the then-exclusive jurisdiction
of the judicial branch by the executive. 141

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018).
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1374.
See id. at 1369 (citing McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898)).
Id. at 1384 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1376 (majority opinion).
35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1376.
Id.
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The Court stressed, however, that its holding was limited to the
question of the constitutionality of IPRs only. 142 For example, the Court
pointed out that “Oil States [did] not challenge the retroactive application
of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place when
its patent issued.” 143 In addition, the Court noted that it was not
determining that IPR proceedings could not raise due process concerns. 144
Finally, the Court emphasized that the holding should not be misconstrued
to suggest that other constitutional challenges could not be made; for
example, challenges related to the Due Process Clause or the Takings
Clause. 145
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence that was joined by Justices
Ginsberg and Sotomayor. 146 Even though he joined the Court’s opinion in
full, Justice Breyer wrote to stress that the decision should not be read as
stating that matters involving private rights could never be adjudicated
outside of Article III courts. 147
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, joined by the Chief Justice, 148 explained
that the history of the patent system and the prior case law required the
finding that patents are private rights, and therefore must be adjudicated
in Article III courts. 149
F.

SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu (2018) (Opinion of the Court by Justice
Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito; dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg, joined
by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan; dissenting opinion by
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, and
joined except as to Part III-A by Justice Kagan).

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit on
April 24, 2018,, in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu. 150 In a rare close decision
in a patent case, Justice Gorsuch (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) provided a textual explication of the IPR
statute in deciding that the Patent Office was compelled to render a final
written decision (FWD) on all claims challenged by a petitioner in an IPR

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
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Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1379–80 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1379.
Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1380–86.
See generally SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
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petition. 151 This decision overruled the Patent Office’s practice that the
Director (through the PTAB) could institute an IPR on less than all
challenged claims and then limit the FWD to only the instituted claims. 152
According to the majority, the decision to institute is binary (either
the PTAB decides to institute or not), but once instituted, the PTAB must
render a decision on all challenged claims. 153 Justice Gorsuch in his
opinion set forth the relevant statutory language he believed supported the
Court’s opinion and the various procedures (one “inquisitorial” in nature,
like ex parte reexamination, in contrast to the more adjudicatory IPR
procedure). 154 IPRs “look[] a good deal more like civil litigation” and are
governed by express provisions in the statute regarding the standards for
instituting an IPR (§§ 311–14), conducting the IPR proceeding (§ 316),
settlement (§ 317), and coming to a final decision on patentability
(§ 318). 155
Justice Gorsuch’s interpretation of the language of the statute is
based on earlier instances of statutory interpretation by the Court along
with reference to dictionaries and legal scholarship. 156 Important terms in
the statute include the use of the word “any” in 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (that
the Patent Office “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the
patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner”) to mean
“every,” stating that “[t]he [Patent Office] cannot curate the claims at
issue but must decide [the validity] of them all.”157 This interpretation is
further supported by the use of the word “shall,” which the opinion notes
“generally imposes a nondiscretionary duty.” 158 This language provides a
“ready answer” to the question presented, the opinion stating that the
language of § 318(a) is “both mandatory and comprehensive” with regard
to the statutory requirement that the PTAB render a FWD on all claims
challenged in an IPR petition. 159
While stating that this analysis “would seem to make this an easy
case,” the opinion reviewed (and rejected) the Director’s arguments to the
contrary. 160 The majority found no basis in the statute for the Director to

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 1358.
37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2016), abrogated by SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1360.
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1355.
Id. at 1353.
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1353–54.
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id. at 1355.
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have discretion regarding “partial institution.” 161 Indeed, the opinion
noted that, unlike in ex parte reexamination, the IPR provisions of the
statute do not permit the Director to initiate an IPR sua sponte. 162 “From
the outset, we see that Congress chose to structure a process in which it’s
the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours of the
proceeding.” 163
The Court majority also found interpretive meaning in further
distinctions between IPR proceedings and ex parte reexamination. 164 In
the latter proceedings, Congress chose “an inquisitorial approach”
(analogous to ex parte examination in the first instance) and thus Congress
“knew exactly how to” expressly give the Director the discretion he
argues he has under the IPR provisions of the America Invents Act.165
“Congress’s choice to depart from the model of a closely related statute is
a choice neither we nor the agency can disregard.” 166
Further, the Court’s opinion cited the language of § 314, which
appears to provide either that the IPR proceedings be instituted or that
they are not, based on the provision that the Director must decide
“‘whether to institute an inter partes review . . . pursuant to the
petition.’” 167 Both the terms “whether” and “pursuant to the petition” had
meaning to the Court majority. “Whether” to institute an IPR implies a
“yes or no” option, and “pursuant to the petition” supports the earlierstated view that what is instituted is an IPR on the claims challenged by
the petitioner. 168 As stated in the opinion, “[n]othing suggests the Director
enjoys a license to depart from the petition and institute a different inter
partes review of his own design.” 169
The majority also held that this portion of the statute, which the
Director relied upon to imply discretion based on the language that the
Director should institute if there is a “reasonable likelihood” that “at least
1 of the claims challenged in the petition” is invalid, implies exactly the
opposite. 170 For the Court majority, “[o]nce that single claim threshold is
satisfied, it doesn’t matter whether the petitioner is likely to prevail on any

161. Id. at 1358.
162. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1355.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1353 (citing Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353–
54 (2013)).
167. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)).
168. Id. at 1355–56.
169. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1356 (emphasis in original).
170. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2011).
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additional claims”; the Director should institute the IPR on all challenged
claims. 171 The opinion again references the ex parte reexamination statute
to show that if Congress had intended to give the Director the discretion
he claims, there was language available to do so. 172
The opinion summarily rejected the Director’s reliance on his
discretion under § 314 to institute an IPR to support his discretion to
institute partially, once again characterizing the decision as binary. 173 This
conclusion is supported, according to the opinion, by the language of the
other provisions in the statute which reference “the petition” rather than
challenged claims, the majority interpreting Congress not to have intended
the Director to have discretion other than whether or not to institute an
IPR against the claims the petitioner challenged.174
With regard to the ambiguity purported to be in the statute due to
slight differences in the language of § 314 and § 318 (which forms the
basis for the dissent’s position), the majority asserted that this is just a
“slight linguistic discrepancy.” 175 Any differences between the claims
challenged in the petition and the claims available for FWD can be
explained by the patentee’s ability to cancel or amend claims, according
to the opinion (terming it a “winnowing mechanism”). 176 The opinion
states that “[w]e need not and will not invent an atextual explanation for
Congress’s drafting choices when the statute’s own terms supply an
answer.” 177
Neither were the Director’s policy arguments persuasive (in contrast
to the effects of these arguments on the dissenting Justices). Even though
“[e]ach side offers plausible reasons why its approach might make for the
more efficient policy[,] who should win that debate isn’t our call to make,”
because “[p]olicy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this
Court.” 178 And “[w]hatever its virtues or vices, Congress’ prescribed
policy here is clear: the petitioner in an inter partes review is entitled to a
decision on all the claims it has challenged” stated the Court, nicely
closing the door on the basis for the dissenting Justices’ contrary
opinion. 179

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1356 (emphasis in original).
Id.
See id. at 1355–56.
Id. at 1356–57.
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1357.
Id.
Id. (citing U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989)).
Id. at 1357–58.
Id. at 1358.
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Because the majority saw no ambiguity in the statutory language,
deference to the agency’s implementation decisions under Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council did not apply. 180 In an interesting side
note (with regard to Justice Gorsuch’s acknowledged antipathy to
Chevron), the majority deigned to leave the continued vitality of the
agency deference doctrine “for another day,” merely holding that “we owe
an agency’s interpretation of the law no deference” if there is (as here, for
these Justices) no ambiguity in the statute’s mandate.181
And not surprisingly, the Court rejected the Director’s final argument
that the question before it was one regarding the institution decision,
which Congress under § 314(d) put beyond judicial review. 182 The
majority reminded the Director that Cuozzo recognized a “strong
presumption” of judicial review of agency decisions, and that judicial
review was necessary to preclude agency “shenanigans” that would
“exceed its ‘statutory bounds.’” 183
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan. 184 These Justices perceived that there was an ambiguity in the
statute resulting from differences in language (albeit slight) between § 314
and § 318 sufficient to support both the Director’s application of the
statute and entitlement to Chevron deference. 185 To the dissenters, the
statutory language is far from being as clear as the majority believed: to
them, the statute is “technical, unclear, and constitutes a minor procedural
part of a larger administrative scheme.” 186 The dissent expressly relied
upon Chevron, characterizing it as “an interpretative technique that judges
often use in such cases” where the statute contains an ambiguity (and
perhaps setting the terms of a future dispute between the Justices on the
question of Chevron deference).187 Using this technique, the dissent found
such an ambiguity, and, further, found that the Director’s interpretation of
the ambiguous statutory language is reasonable (and thus the dissenting
Justices would have affirmed). 188 Helpful in considering the dissenting
Justices’ thinking in this regard, Justice Breyer set forth a hypothetical (as
is his wont) in which a petitioner challenges sixteen claims and the PTAB

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1358.
Id. at 1360 (citing Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016)).
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Id. at 1360 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1361–65.
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institutes an IPR on one of them, and then used this hypothetical as a
practical guidepost for his explication of the statutory language. 189
The dissenting opinion performed its own brand of statutory exegesis
and, unsurprisingly, found ambiguity between reference to claims
challenged in the petition and claims surviving to FWD. 190 These Justices
perceived that the majority relied on its own language that does not
actually exist in the statute (specifically “‘any patent claim challenged by
the petitioner’ in the petitioner’s original petition”) and, for them,
“[w]hich reading we give the statute [their’s or the majority’s] makes a
difference.” 191 Without expressly making the point, the dissent illustrated
that, if these Justices could not agree on the meaning of the statutory
language, such language is prima facie ambiguous and thus Chevron
deference should attach to the Director’s interpretation.192
In addition, these Justices agreed with the Director’s argument that
interpreting the statute as the majority did would impose tremendous
inefficiencies on the PTAB, requiring the PTAB to provide a FWD on
claims that the petitioner had not shown had a reasonable likelihood of
being invalid. 193 This point was emphasized in a one-paragraph, separate
dissent penned by Justice Ginsberg (joined by the other dissenting
Justices), who saw “no cause to believe Congress wanted the [PTAB] to
spend its time so uselessly.” 194
One practical consequence of this decision (that Justice Breyer in his
dissent fully appreciated) is that it provides a route for a petitioner,
unhappy that the PTAB refused to institute IPR on any particular claim,
to appeal the FWD and thus overcome the prohibition in the statute that
the institution decision is at the Director’s discretion, and not appealable.
This is clearly contrary to the legislative scheme (and Justice Sotomayor,
one of the dissenting Justices here, at oral argument quizzed counsel
aggressively on whether the entire exercise was a way to get around the
Court’s Cuozzo decision). 195 This decision also raises the possibility that
the PTAB, rather than issue an appealable FWD on claims that do not rise
to the “reasonable likelihood” standard, will instead refuse to institute
using language in the decision providing a roadmap for further petitions
of more limited scope that it will institute. No matter how the PTAB
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
16-969).

Id. at 1361.
Id.
Id. at 1361–62.
See id. at 1360.
See id.
See SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–11, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (No.
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adapts its practices to avoid the outcome mandated by this decision, the
majority’s clear holding provides the basis for the Patent Office and the
public to petition Congress to intercede to change the statutory language
to give the Director the discretion the Court majority could not find in the
statute Congress enacted.
G.

Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Panel: Chief Judge Prost
and Circuit Judges Taranto and Hughes; Opinion by Chief Judge
Prost)

On October 5, 2017, the Federal Circuit rendered a decision in
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi that brought clarity to how the Court (and Patent
Office) should apply the written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. §
112(a) to properly circumscribe the scope of claims to monoclonal
antibodies. 196 As a bonus, the panel opined on the relationship between
the various requirements for a court to grant a permanent injunction when
the infringing article comprises a medicine or other therapeutic agent.197
Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent focus on patent law questions
(and the uncertainty and jurisprudential chaos that has arisen as a
consequence), the Federal Circuit spent almost a decade refining
application of the written description requirement to biotechnology patent
claims. Arguably beginning with Amgen v. Chugai 198 and Fiers v.
Revel, 199 the Court spoke most clearly in University of California v. Eli
Lilly & Co. 200; this jurisprudence matured in University of Rochester v.
G.D. Searle 201 and Enzo Biochem v. GenProbe, 202 culminating in the
Court’s Ariad v. Eli Lilly 203 en banc decision that the written description
and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (now, 35
U.S.C. § 112(a)), were separate and distinct and could be differentially
satisfied on the same disclosure (i.e., enablement could be satisfied even
though the written description requirement was not). 204

196. See generally Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, Amgen
Inc. v. Sanofi, 139 S. Ct. 787 (2019).
197. See id.
198. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.,927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
199. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
200. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
201. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
202. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
203. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
204. See generally Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d 1200; Fiers, 984 F.2d 1164; Regents of the Univ. of
California, 119 F.3d 1559; Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d 916; Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d 956; Ariad
Pharm., 598 F.3d 1336 (en banc).
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These cases arose from the complexities of assessing the sufficiency
of disclosure for claims to isolated nucleic acids (including cDNA
molecules that remain patent-eligible after AMP v. Myriad Genetics). 205
Another complex class of important biomolecules, antibodies, and, in
particular, monoclonal antibodies, have had a more murky course through
§ 112 jurisprudence; the issue in the few decided cases related to the
requirements for producing humanized and ultimately human antibodies
from (typically) mouse monoclonal progenitors rather than the scope of
antibody claims as they relate to antigenic specificity. 206 The Federal
Circuit’s decision in this case provides some clarity in this regard. 207
The case arose when Amgen sued Sanofi over its sales of Praluent
(alirocumab) in competition with Amgen’s Repatha (evolocumab) drug;
Amgen’s asserted patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 8,829,165 (165 patent) and
8,859,741(741 patent), claim a genus of antibodies that encompass
Sanofi’s Praluent product. 208 As background, blood plasma contains lowdensity lipoproteins that bind cholesterol and are associated with atherosclerotic plaque formation. 209 Liver cells express receptors for LDL
(LDL-R) wherein binding thereto reduces the amount of LDL cholesterol
in blood and reduces the risk of plaque formation and cardiovascular disease. 210 PCSK9 (proprotein convertase subtilisin kexin type 9) is a molecule that binds to and causes liver cell LDL-R to be destroyed, thus reducing the capacity and effectiveness of the liver cell’s ability to reduce serum
LDL-cholesterol. 211 The antibodies at issue in this suit bind to PCSK9 and
prevent PCSK9 from binding to LDL-R, causing their destruction and
hence improving the capacity of the liver to clear the blood of serum cholesterol. 212 Claim 1 of the ‘165 patent is representative:
1. An isolated monoclonal antibody, wherein, when bound to
PCSK9, the monoclonal antibody binds to at least one of the
following residues: S153, I154, P155, R194, D238, A239, I369,
S372, D374, C375, T377, C378, F379, V380, or S381 of SEQ ID

205. See Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, Amgen Inc.
v. Sanofi, 139 S. Ct. 787 (2019).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. U.S. Patent No. 8,829,165 (filed Apr. 10, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,859,741 (filed Apr. 24,
2014).
209. Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1371.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1371.
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NO:3, and wherein the monoclonal antibody blocks binding of
PCSK9 to LDL[-]R. 213

It is important to note that, while reciting the structure of the residues on
PCSK9 that are bound by the claimed antibody, the claim does not recite
any structural limitations of the antibody itself. The only antibody
characteristic recited as a limitation is a functional one, i.e., the ability to
bind (and not even specifically bind) to at least one of the recited PCSK9
residues.
Evidence at trial showed that Amgen had produced a plurality of
anti-PCSK9 antibodies and screened them for the ability to inhibit PCSK9
binding to LDL-R in the liver. 214 This screening was done using a “trial
and error” process that reduced 3,000 human monoclonal antibodies down
to 85 antibodies that “blocked interaction between the PCSK9 . . . and the
LDLR [at] greater than 90%,” of which the specification illustrated the
three-dimensional binding arrangement for two (one of which became the
Repatha™ antibody) by x-ray crystallography. 215 The specification of the
Amgen patents in suit discloses amino acid sequence information for 22
human anti-PCSK9 antibodies able to compete for PCSK9 binding with
these two more fully characterized antibodies. 216 Regeneron’s patents (not
at issue here) recited antibody-specific amino acid sequences for its
claimed anti-PCSK9 antibodies. 217
The jury found Amgen’s patents not to be invalid; Sanofi stipulated
to infringement. 218 The district court excluded Sanofi’s evidence relating
to written description and enablement based on Praluent and other postpriority date antibodies (i.e., that were produced after Amgen’s earliest
priority date). 219 The district court, relying on Noelle v. Lederman 220 as
precedent, instructed the jury that an applicant can be entitled to claim
scope encompassing generically described antibodies (as was the case for
Amgen’s claims) provided that the applicant provided a full characterized,
novel antigen: 221
In the case of a claim to antibodies, the correlation between structure
and function may also be satisfied by the disclosure of a newly

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
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Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1372.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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characterized antigen by its structure, formula, chemical name, or
physical properties if you find that the level of skill and knowledge in
the art of antibodies at the time of filing was such that production of
antibodies against such an antigen was conventional or routine. 222

The district court denied Sanofi’s post-trial motion for judgment as
a matter of law (JMOL) that Amgen’s claims were invalid for failing the
written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a),
and granted Amgen’s motion for JMOL that the claims were
nonobvious. 223 On this record, the district court also granted Amgen a
permanent injunction preventing Sanofi from selling Praluent (which was
stayed pending Sanofi’s appeal). 224
The Federal Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded, in an opinion by Chief Judge Prost, joined by Judges
Taranto and Hughes. 225 The opinion distinguished two bases for a court
to consider post-priority date evidence of failure to satisfy the written
description requirement, and found that the district court misapplied the
law in excluding Sanofi’s evidence. 226 The first basis for considering postfiling evidence regarding written description is when the evidence is
proffered to show whether there was sufficient disclosure in the
specification as filed and for this purpose the panel stated that postpriority date evidence is improper. 227 Here, Sanofi’s evidence was
proffered under the second basis, which is whether the specification
discloses a representative number of species in a claimed genus. 228 For
such purposes, the opinion held that post-priority evidence is admissible,
because such evidence can show that the genus is sufficiently diverse that
the number of species disclosed in the specification is not
representative. 229 As set forth in Ariad, an adequate written description of
a genus requires the specification to disclose “a representative number of
species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features
common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can
‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” 230 The panel
222.
223.
2017).
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
2010)).

Id.; see also Noelle, 355 F.3d 1343.
Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1371; see generally Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 227 F. Supp. 3d 333 (D. Del.
Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1371, 1373.
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1373–74.
Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1373 (citing Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
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distinguished prior precedent cited by Amgen, including In re Koller 231,
and In re Hogan 232, because those cases were directed to the first basis for
evaluating whether a specification satisfies the written description
requirement. 233 (Another reason is that the second basis recognized by the
opinion is arguably a creation of the Federal Circuit’s more recent written
description jurisprudence.) 234
The opinion acknowledged that the Court had not directly addressed
this application of the law to date, but found it to be consistent with the
Court’s earlier decision in AbbVie. 235 In AbbVie, the accused infringer
used evidence from its own, later-developed antibodies to show that
patentee AbbVie’s claims were not supported by an adequate written
description of a representative number of species within the claimed
antibody genus (although, as the opinion admits, defendant’s antibody
“was a basis for the unrepresentativeness ruling without regard to whether
it postdated the patent’s priority date”). 236 With regard to the Hogan
precedent (which is binding on Federal Circuit panel opinions unless
overturned by the en banc Court), the opinion states:
Appellees misread In re Hogan by conflating the difference between
post-priority-date evidence proffered to illuminate the post-priority-date
state of the art, which is improper, with post-priority-date evidence
proffered to show that a patent fails to disclose a representative number
of species. In re Hogan prohibits the former but is silent with respect to
the latter. 237

Hogan was based on the Patent Office requiring an applicant to
disclose, at an application’s filing date, species that did not exist at that
time. 238 The panel understood that not to be analogous to the case before
it, and stated that as a consequence, the district court’s exclusion of
Sanofi’s evidence relating to whether Amgen’s specification disclosed a
representative number of species was error. 239 The Court remanded the
matter to the district court for a new trial on this issue. 240

231. In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 825 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
232. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
233. Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1373.
234. Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1374–75; see AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech,
Inc., 759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
235. Id. at 1374.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1374─75.
238. See generally In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
239. Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1375.
240. Id.
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The Court also found it to be error for the district court to have
excluded evidence regarding enablement on the same grounds. This
evidence related to the “lengthy and potentially undue experimentation”
Amgen needed to employ to arrive at its antibodies that fell within the
scope of the claims of the ‘165 and ‘741 patents. 241 This was relevant
evidence not barred by its post-priority date origins, and the panel
remanded for a new trial on enablement in light of this evidence.242
Perhaps the most significant portion of the opinion involves the jury
instructions, which relied on Noelle v. Lederman for the proposition that
characterizing a new antigen was sufficient to satisfy the statute for claims
encompassing a broad genus of antibodies that could bind to the new
antigen. 243 The panel found that this instruction “is not legally sound and
[] not based on any binding precedent”, and then provided its legal
analysis of Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 244 Noelle v.
Lederman, 245 and Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs 246 in
support of its conclusion. 247
The basis for the instruction, according to the opinion, is in
guidelines from the Patent Office discussed by the Court in Enzo. 248
There, the Court noted (in dicta, as characterized in this opinion), that the
Patent Office would find claims to an antibody in compliance with Section
112 “notwithstanding the functional definition of the antibody, in light of
the well-defined structural characteristics for the five classes of antibody,
the functional characteristics of antibody binding, and the fact that the
antibody technology is well developed and mature.” 249 The decision in
Noelle was actually contrary (the claims were not entitled to priority to an
earlier application because that application did not disclose “the structural
elements of the antibody or antigen”) but (again in dicta) stated that “as
long as an applicant has disclosed a ‘fully characterized antigen,’ either
by its structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, or by
depositing the protein in a public depository, the applicant can then claim
an antibody by its binding affinity to that described antigen” based on the
Court’s Enzo decision. 250 Finally, in Centocor, the Court questioned, as
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1376.
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1376.
Id.
Id. (citing Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 964).
Id. at 1377 (citing Noelle, 355 F.3d at 1349).
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Amgen did here, the interpretation of its precedent that an applicant was
entitled to a broad claim based solely on functional properties (e.g.,
binding affinity or specificity) of an antibody so long as the applicant
provided a fully characterized, novel antigen. 251 As expressed in
Centocor, one basis for skepticism over the “fully characterized antigen”
test advocated there and here (by Amgen) was that instead of “analogizing
the antibody-antigen relationship to a ‘key in a lock’, it was more apt to
analogize it to a lock and ‘a ring with a million keys on it.’” 252 The panel
emphasized that because the written description requirement is a question
of fact, the value of these cases as precedent is “extremely limited.” 253
The panel held this instruction to be improper because it effectively
eliminated the written description requirement from the statute in favor of
enablement, contrary to the Court’s en banc decision in Ariad, stating that
“[b]y permitting a finding of adequate written description merely from a
finding of ability to make and use, the challenged sentence of the jury
instruction in this case ran afoul of what is perhaps the core ruling of
Ariad.” 254 And the panel found that whether the relationship between the
structure of the antigen, no matter how fully characterized, and any of its
cognate antibodies is (here and hitherto) “hotly disputed” which precluded
the Court from making any definitive finding. 255 The panel recited its
abrogation of the “fully characterized antigen” test expressly:
Further, the “newly characterized antigen” test flouts basic legal
principles of the written description requirement. Section 112 requires a
“written description of the invention.” But this test allows patentees to
claim antibodies by describing something that is not the invention, i.e.,
the antigen. The test thus contradicts the statutory “quid pro quo” of the
patent system where “one describes an invention, and, if the law’s other
requirements are met, one obtains a patent.” Indeed, we have generally
eschewed judicial exceptions to the written description requirement
based on the subject matter of the claims. 256

For the same reasons the opinion affirmed the district court’s denial
of JMOL that Amgen’s claims lack written description and enablement in

251. See id. at 1377.
252. Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1377 (emphasis in original) (citing Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
253. Id. (citing Centocor, 636 F.3d at 1349).
254. Id. at 1378.
255. Id.
256. Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1378–79 (citations omitted).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 2

676

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:637

favor of those questions being decided on remand based on the facts
properly permitted to be considered by the jury. 257
Turning to the grounds for granting Amgen a permanent injunction,
the panel found error in how the district court applied the standards
enunciated by the Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.: 258
[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor
test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 259

Here, the district court granted the injunction despite finding that an
injunction would “disserve” the public interest in the absence of plaintiff
Amgen refuting this conclusion. 260 The panel’s plain reading of the
Supreme Court’s mandate held this to be error. 261 In addition, the panel
held to be error the district court’s finding that the public interest would
be disserved because the effect of the injunction would be to “tak[e] an
independently developed, helpful drug off the market.” 262 According to
the opinion, using this standard a court would never be able to enjoin an
infringing drug product because that would always involve taking a
helpful drug off the market, contrary to both eBay and 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(4)(B). 263
This case is the latest application of the Federal Circuit’s written
description doctrine, which is one of the few areas that the Supreme Court
has not found it fit to question the Court’s application of U.S. patent law.
On the one hand this is curious, because written description is perhaps the
preeminent example of the Federal Circuit exercising its special expertise
and Congressional mandate to provide a harmonized interpretation of
patent law. On the other hand, how the Federal Circuit has developed this
area of the law has, generally, limited the scope of biotechnology patent
claims, consistent with the Supreme Court’s penchant for treating the
patent grant parsimoniously. In any case, this decision makes the
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See id. at 1380.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1381 (emphasis added) (quoting MercExchange 547 U.S. at 391).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1381 (citing WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
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application of the written description requirement, as applied to antibody
claims, more consistent with how the Court has applied § 112 to other
biotechnological inventions, and, thus, is in keeping with past twenty
years of the Court’s jurisprudence. It is also more congruent with how the
technology has developed since monoclonal antibodies were first
disclosed (but not patented) by Kohler and Milstein in 1973. If such
consistency is the proper role of the Federal Circuit, then this decision is
an exemplar of it fulfilling that role.
H.

Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc. (2017) (Opinion of the Court by Justice
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer,
Ginsburg, Gorsuch, Kagan, Kennedy, Sotomayor; concurring
opinion by Justice Breyer)

On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion
in Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., marking the first time the Court has
interpreted the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA)
for the approval of biosimilar drugs. 264 The Court described the statute as
“a carefully calibrated scheme for preparing to adjudicate, and then
adjudicating, claims of infringement” related to biosimilar
applications. 265 This process begins with the disclosure by the biosimilar
applicant of its an abbreviated Biologics License Application (aBLA) and
related information in order to “enable the sponsor to evaluate the
biosimilar for possible infringement of patents it holds on the reference
product . . . .” 266 Nevertheless, the Court held that the reference product
sponsor (RPS) cannot seek enforcement of the disclosure provision in 42
U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) by injunction under federal law, 267 substantially
agreeing with the Federal Circuit.268 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for the Federal Circuit to consider the question
whether the disclosure provision was enforceable under state law, or
whether the BPCIA pre-empted any state law claim. 269 With regard to the
180-day notice-of-commercial-marketing provision of the statute, the
Court reversed the Federal Circuit and held that the notice may be
provided “either before or after receiving FDA approval.” 270

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
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In 2014 Sandoz became the first company to file an aBLA pursuant
to the BPCIA’s abbreviated pathway found at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k). 271 This
application was for approval to market a biosimilar version of Amgen’s
Neupogen (filgrastim) biologic drug product. 272 Filgrastrim is a 175
amino acid recombinant methionyl human granulocyte colonystimulating factor (r-metHuG-CSF), and is often prescribed for cancer
patients on chemotherapy at times when patients are at most risk of
infection because their white blood cell count is low. 273 However, despite
availing itself of this pathway for FDA approval, Sandoz refused to
participate in the patent resolution component (the disclosure and
information exchange provisions, also known colloquially as the “patent
dance”), alleging that it was not a mandatory component. 274 Amgen
responded by filing suit on October 24, 2014, requesting in part a
preliminary injunction to prevent Sandoz from entering the market before
the issues could be resolved by the Court. 275 The Northern District of
California denied Amgen’s motion, ruling that the disclosure and notice
provisions of the BPCIA were not mandatory. 276 And, in a remarkably
fractured decision, the Federal Circuit agreed. 277
The first question considered by the Court addressed the patent
dance:
Is an Applicant required by 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) to provide the
Sponsor with a copy of its biologics license application and related
manufacturing information, which the statute says the Applicant “shall
provide,” and, where an Applicant fails to provide that required
information, is the Sponsor’s sole recourse to commence a declaratory-

271. FDA accepts Sandoz application biosimilar filgrastim, SANDOZ: A NOVARTIS DIVISION,
(July 24, 2014), https://www.sandoz.com/news/media-releases/fda-accepts-sandoz-applicationbiosimilar-filgrastim [https://perma.cc/LM72-GVX4].
272. FDA accepts Sandoz application biosimilar filgrastim, SANDOZ: A NOVARTIS DIVISION,
(July 24, 2014), https://www.sandoz.com/news/media-releases/fda-accepts-sandoz-applicationbiosimilar-filgrastim [https://perma.cc/LM72-GVX4].
(FILGRASTIM),
273. See
Prescribing
Information,
NEUPOGEN
https://www.neupogenhcp.com/important-safety-information/
[https://perma.cc/9LBB-2WLQ];
NEUPOGEN (FILGRASTIM), HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, 2, 14,
https://www.pi.amgen.com/~/media/amgen/repositorysites/pi-amgencom/neupogen/neupogen_pi_hcp_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV52-L5ZV].
274. Sandoz, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1676.
275. Id. at 1673.
276. Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 14–cv–04741–RS, 2015 WL 1264756, 10 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
19, 2015), aff’d in part and vacated in part by 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
277. Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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judgment action under 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) and/or a patentinfringement action under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii)? 278

The Federal Circuit Court essentially sidestepped the question of whether
the statutory commandment that a biosimilar applicant “shall provide”
indicates that the requirement is mandatory, and, instead, held that an RPS
cannot seek enforcement of this section by injunction under federal law. 279
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that the BPCIA
provides the exclusive federal remedy for failure to disclose the required
information by authorizing an RPS to bring an immediate declaratoryjudgment action: 280
If a subsection (k) applicant fails to provide the application and
information required under paragraph (2)(A), the reference product
sponsor, but not the subsection (k) applicant, may bring an action under
section 2201 of Title 28, for a declaration of infringement, validity, or
enforceability of any patent that claims the biological product or a use
of the biological product. 281

The Supreme Court continued, however, by concluding that the
Federal Circuit erred in relying on 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) as precluding
state law remedies. 282 As the Supreme Court explained, failure to disclose
the aBLA and related information is not part of the artificial act of
infringement established in § 271(e)(2)(c): 283
It shall be an act of infringement to submit—
(i) with respect to a patent that is identified in the list of patents
described in section 351(l)(3) of the Public Health Service Act
(including as provided under section 351(l)(7) of such Act), an
application seeking approval of a biological product, or
(ii) if the applicant for the application fails to provide the
application and information required under section 351(l)(2)(A) of
such Act, an application seeking approval of a biological product
for a patent that could be identified pursuant to section
351(l)(3)(A)(i) of such Act,
if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act
to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug,

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
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veterinary biological product, or biological product claimed in a patent
or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such
patent. 284

As the Court put it: “The flaw in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is
that Sandoz’s failure to disclose its application and manufacturing
information was not an act of artificial infringement, and thus was not
remediable under § 271(e)(4).” 285 Instead, the artificial infringement is the
act of submitting the application. 286 The language in the statute regarding
noncompliance with § 262(l)(2)(A) is not an element of infringement, but
rather “merely assists in identifying which patents will be the subject of
the artificial infringement suit.” 287 As a result, the exclusive remedies
outlined in § 271(e)(4) for this artificial infringement do not apply. 288
Instead, the Supreme Court remanded this issue back to the Federal
Circuit to determine whether an injunction is available under state law to
enforce § 262(l)(2)(A), or whether state law enforcement is preempted by
BPCIA. 289 If the Federal Circuit were to determine that state-law remedies
are pre-empted (as it later did), 290 biosimilar applicants would be able to
continue withholding information required by the BPCIA without threat
of enforcement of that provision. 291
The second question before the Court was whether a biosimilar
applicant could give the 180-day Notice of Commercial Marketing prior
to FDA approval, or whether such notice would not be effective until FDA
approval (as the Federal Circuit held below). 292 This question was related
to interpretation of another part of the statute, 42 U.S.C § 262(l)(8)(A):
“The subsection (k) applicant shall provide notice to the reference product
sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of the first commercial
marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection (k).” 293
Sandoz had provided this notice prior to obtaining FDA approval, and the
district court agreed with Sandoz that this notice was effective. 294
284. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(c) (2010).
285. Sandoz, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1674.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1675.
289. Id. at 1676.
290. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
291. Id. The Federal Circuit later found that state law remedies were preempted by the BPCIA;
see, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2017) -- One Last Dance . . . (December 14, 2017)(
https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/12/amgen-inc-v-sandoz-inc-fed-cir-2017-one-last-dance-.html)
292. Sandoz, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1677.
293. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A) (2017) (emphasis added).
294. Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 14–cv–04741–RS, 2015 WL 1264756, *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
19, 2015), aff’d in part and vacated in part by 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Sandoz’s biosimilar, under the brand name Zarxio, obtained FDA
approval on March 5, 2015, and under the district court’s interpretation of
the statute Sandoz was free to enter the market (an outcome prevented by
an injunction granted by the Federal Circuit pending its decision on
appeal). 295 The Federal Circuit had agreed with Amgen that notice could
only effectively be given after the biosimilar product has been approved
by the FDA. 296 According to the Federal Circuit, while in other portions
of the statute the biosimilar product is referred to as “the biological
product that is the subject of the application,” in subsection (l)(8)(A) the
statute reads “the biological product licensed under subsection (k).” 297
The change in language indicated to the Federal Circuit that “[i]f Congress
intended paragraph (l)(8)(A) to permit effective notice before the product
is licensed, it would have used the ‘subject of’ language.” 298 The appellate
court appreciated that Congress made this distinction at least in part
because it is only after licensure that “the product, its therapeutic uses,
and its manufacturing processes are fixed,” something that even the
biosimilar applicant does not know with certainty when it applies for FDA
approval. 299
In addition, “[g]iving notice after FDA licensure, once the scope of
the approved license is known and the marketing of the proposed
biosimilar product is imminent, allows the RPS to effectively determine
whether, and on which patents, to seek a preliminary injunction from the
court.” 300 This permits “a fully crystallized controversy” between the
parties to have arisen when suit is filed, and “provides a defined statutory
window during which the court and the parties can fairly assess the
parties’ rights prior to the launch of the biosimilar product.” 301
Interpreting the statute as advanced by Sandoz would, on the contrary,
result in a situation where “the RPS would be left to guess the scope of
the approved license and when commercial marketing would actually
begin.” 302 Sandoz presented this question to the Court in
its certiorari petition: “Whether notice of commercial marketing given
before FDA approval can be effective and whether, in any event, treating
Section 262(l)(8)(A) as a stand-alone requirement and creating an

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
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injunctive remedy that delays all biosimilars by 180 days after approval is
improper.” 303
The Supreme Court reversed. 304 The Court’s analysis regarding the
180-day notice provisions of the statute was straightforward. 305 The Court
held that the Federal Circuit had misinterpreted the statutory language by
imposing a requirement for FDA approval before proper notice could be
given. 306 According to the opinion, the reference in the statute to a
licensed biosimilar product was to the term “commercial marketing” not
“notice,” and thus just imposed the requirement that a product be licensed
before it is marketed. 307 With this interpretation the notice was not tied to
a product having been licensed before notice was given, as the Federal
Circuit had held, but to the unremarkable reality that the product had to
be licensed before it was sold. 308 The Supreme Court found only one
timing requirement in the statute; that notice must be provided 180 days
prior to marketing the biosimilar product. 309 The opinion recognized the
Federal Circuit opinion to contain a second timing requirement, that FDA
had approved the biosimilar. 310 This second requirement was not in the
statute according to the Court and hence requiring approval was a
misinterpretation of the statutory language by the Federal Circuit. 311 This
conclusion was supported for the Court by the structure of subsection
§262(l)(8)(B). 312 According to the opinion, Congress would have used
this structure in its language for §262(l)(8)(A) if it intended the provision
to have the interpretation applied by the Federal Circuit. 313
Outside this question of statutory interpretation, the Court identified
the policy arguments raised by the parties and the government and refused
to be persuaded by the plausible contentions set forth therein. 314 Rather,
the Court recommended that Congress is the appropriate body for making

303. Sandoz, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1677.
304. Id. at 1678.
305. See id. at 1677.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Sandoz, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1677 (42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(B) reads, in part, “[a]fter receiving
the notice under subparagraph (A) and before such date of the first commercial marketing of such
biological product, the reference product sponsor may seek a preliminary injunction. . . .” (emphasis
added)).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1678.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss3/2

46

Noonan and Torrance: Top Biotechnology Patent Law Cases

2018]

TOP BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW CASES 2018

683

these policy distinctions and advised the parties to go there to effect a
change in the law. 315
Justice Breyer filed a brief concurring opinion, directed to his
concerns (voiced during oral argument) that Congress had delegated
responsibility to the FDA for interpreting the statute, based in part on its
greater expertise. 316 The Justice thus invited the agency to “depart from,
or to modify, today’s interpretation” under the appropriate circumstance,
citing National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet
Services, to support his interpretation of the agency’s authority in this
regard. 317
I.

Regeneron Pharmaceuticals v. Merus (2018) (Denial of Certiorari
by Supreme Court)

On October 1, 2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals in its appeal of the Federal Circuit’s decision
in Regeneron Pharmaceuticals v. Merus that affirmed the district court’s
decision that the claims of Regeneron’s patent-in-suit were unenforceable
due to inequitable conduct in the patent’s procurement. 318 In so doing, the
Court passed up the opportunity to consider whether the split panel’s
decision was consistent with the Federal Circuit’s own inequitable
conduct jurisprudence, most recently handed down en banc in
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co. 319 The Court also passed
up an opportunity to clarify, for the first time in over 70 years, a doctrine
stemming directly from an ancient trio of its own decisions. 320 Under the
circumstances, it is prudent for patent practitioners (prosecutors as well as
litigators) to consider the lessons of the Federal Circuit’s Regeneron
decision.
To recap, the case arose over Regeneron’s infringement suit against
Merus involving U.S. Patent No. 8,502,018, 321 which is directed to
transgenic mice expressing human variable domain immunoglobulin (Ig)

315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Assn. v. Brand X Internet
Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982–84 (2005)).
318. Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 122 (2018).
319. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
320. See generally Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1944);
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); Keystone Driller
Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
321. U.S. Patent No. 8,502,018 (filed June 20, 2011).
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genes. 322 Claim 1 is representative: “1. A genetically modified mouse,
comprising in its germline human unrearranged variable region gene
segments inserted at an endogenous mouse immunoglobulin locus.” 323
As explained in the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the types of antibody
molecules that can be produced in mice using modern immunological and
molecular biological techniques ranges from completely murine to
completely human, and also include chimeric antibodies (encoded by
human constant region genes and mouse variable domain genes) and
“reverse” chimeric antibodies (encoded by human variable region genes
and mouse constant region genes). 324 These possibilities are illustrated in
the brief by a diagram (where green portions of the antibodies are encoded
by mouse genes and yellow portions are encoded by human genes): 325

Relevant to the issues before the Court was construction of the proper
scope and meaning of the term “comprising in its germline human
unrearranged variable region gene segments.” 326 Regeneron argued that
this term was limited to inserting only human unrearranged variable
regions genes, and thus only reverse chimeric antibodies would be
encoded in the recombinant mouse genome; Regeneron argued its
construction was supported by the plain meaning of the term and the ‘018
patent specification.327 Merus, on the other hand, argued that the word
“comprising” in the claim made the proper construction broader than just
insertion of human unrearranged variable region gene segments, but also
encompassed mice having genomes that encoded humanized, fully

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1349.
Id. at 1348.
Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1348.
Id.
Id. at 1348–49.
Id. at 1352.
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human, and reverse chimeric antibody embodiments. 328 The district court
adopted Merus’ construction, and the Federal Circuit agreed. 329
This leads to the first lesson from the case: with regard to the but-for
materiality prong of the Therasense test, the issue arises whether the
standard of claim construction used by the examiner—broadest
reasonable interpretation or BRI—is sufficient to prevent the district court
from applying its own claim construction, consistent with Phillips v. AWH
Corp., to arrive at a different conclusion. 330 Here, whether the withheld
references were but-for material depended on whether the interpretation
of the phrase “comprising [human variable chain immunoglobulin genes]”
was at least as broad before the Patent Office as it was before the district
court. 331 (It is an unstated assumption that it should be, because the
possibility that an applicant can amend the claims under the BRI test
should make this the broadest construction.) If, as Regeneron contended,
the claim language precluded embodiments wherein all or part of the
human constant region genes were included, then the materiality of the
undisclosed references may not have been as apparent to Regeneron or the
examiner as it was to the district court and a majority of the Federal Circuit
panel. This raises a serious issue of whether a district court must (or at
least should) be bound by evidence of the context of prosecution to
determine whether the examiner would have considered an uncited
reference to satisfy the but-for materiality test (which reasonably should
be the standard for whether an applicant or applicant’s counsel withheld
material references during prosecution). Under the Federal Circuit’s
Regeneron opinion the answer is no; this suggests that a patent prosecutor
has two options for prudent practice: either make explicit (even if only by
repeating any claim construction assertions made by the examiner) what
the claims terms mean (contemporary practice avoids anything so
potentially limiting) or expanding the scope of disclosure beyond either
the applicant’s or the examiner’s understanding to preclude any
interpretation from being broader that the one before the examiner.
Turning to the references, it was undisputed that during prosecution
of the ‘018 patent, four references were known to Regeneron and its
counsel that were not cited to the Patent Office. These references are:
1.

328.
329.
330.
331.
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Mice,” 17(8) Review Immunology Today 391 (1996)
(Brüggemann); 332
2.

Shinsuke Taki et al., “Targeted Insertion of a Variable Region
Gene into the Immunoglobulin Heavy Chain Locus,” 262
Science 1268 (1993) (Taki); 333

3.

Yong–Rui Zou et al, “Cre-lox P-mediated Gene Replacement:
A Mouse Strain Producing Humanized Antibodies,” 4(12)
Current Biology 1099 (1994) (Zou); 334 and

4.

WIPO Patent Publication No. WO 91/00906 entitled
“Chimeric and Transgenic Animals Capable of Producing
Human Antibodies,” credited to Clive Wood et al. (Wood). 335

These references were cited by a third party during prosecution of a
related application after Regeneron received a Notice of Allowance for
the ‘018 patent. 336 Regeneron did not submit these references to the Patent
Office in the application that was granted as the ‘018 patent but did cite
these references in all other pending related applications. 337
This leads to the second lesson: cite everything, particularly
references that are genuinely unknown to anyone under a Rule 56 duty,
and when that art becomes known before allowed patent claims are
permitted to issue. Any such reference will need to be cited, as Regeneron
did, in all further related applications, and compliance with the duty of
candor in those cases can be used (as it was here) as evidence supporting
the materiality of the references. (These actions can also be used to
support an inference of an intent to deceive; the district court’s application
of an adverse inference, infra, prevented its decision from being an issue
on appeal.)
The district court made the following findings of fact regarding the
uncited references:
•

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Brüggemann was a review article that suggested replacing
mouse Ig genes with human Ig genes in the mouse Ig locus.
This specific “swapping” of the mouse and human genes would
be an improvement over random integration (this was an
argument Regeneron had made in support of its own
invention). Regeneron’s basis for distinguishing this reference

Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1349.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1349.
Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1350.
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was that it does not teach reverse chimeric antibodies, but the
district court’s claim construction vitiated whatever force that
argument may have had (or the significance of that argument
on the materiality of the reference). 338
•

The Wood reference (according to the district court) also
disclosed Ig locus targeting, based on expert testimony. The
materiality of this reference was also based on its teaching that
the constant region can be exogenous or endogenous, and thus
encompasses insertion into the mouse Ig locus. 339

•

The Taki reference disclosed insertion of variable region genes
from one mouse into another mouse, but the district court found
the relevant consideration to be targeting exogenous Ig genes
into an endogenous mouse Ig locus, not the mouse-human
distinction. However, neither the district court nor the Federal
Circuit addressed the distinction with the ‘018 patent claims
that Taki discloses introduction of rearranged variable region
genes and the ‘018 patent claims introduction of unrearranged
human variable region genes. 340

•

The Zou reference disclosed modifying mouse constant region
not variable region genes; but here again, the district court
found the salient disclosure was targeting exogenous Ig genes
into the mouse Ig locus. 341

Although neither the district court nor the Federal Circuit found these
references, alone or in combination, satisfied the requirements in the
statute for invalidating the ‘018 patent claims (a fact noted in Judge
Newman’s dissent), the district court found that these references were butfor material, and this satisfied the first prong of the Therasense test for
finding inequitable conduct. 342
The district court also found that these references were not
cumulative over the cited prior art, in particular U.S. Patent No. 6,114,598
to Kucherlapati, and a reference to Lonberg that had been overcome
during prosecution of the ‘018 patent. 343 Regeneron argued that the
Brüggemann reference was cumulative over Kucherlapati; the Wood
reference was cumulative over Lonberg; and the Taki reference was

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
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cumulative over the combination of Kucherlapati and Lonberg. 344
Specifically, Regeneron argued that Kucherlapati taught substitution of an
exogenous (xenogeneic) locus at an endogenous target locus in the mouse
genome, and that Lonberg taught a “knockout plus transgene” model,
where the human antibody-encoding sequences are randomly inserted and
the endogenous mouse Ig genes are disabled. 345 The district court
distinguished the Kucherlapati reference from the Brüggemann reference
by finding that Kucherlapati taught wholesale replacement of exogenous
immunoglobulin (Ig) genes for the endogenous mouse Ig locus, and that
such a replacement included mouse regulatory sequences whose removal
could interfere with normal B-cell development and antibody
production. 346 With regard to the Lonberg reference, the district court
found that the Wood reference taught targeted insertion (as recited in the
‘018 patent claims) while Lonberg taught insertion at random sites in the
mouse genome. 347 And the district court found that the combination of
Kucherlapati and Lonberg was not cumulative to the Taki reference
because Taki taught targeted insertion, and neither Kucherlapati nor
Lonberg have these teachings. 348
This is the third lesson: it can be challenging to apprehend the
decisions a district court judge may make regarding whether uncited
references are cumulative. A defendant’s expert will likely be the vehicle
for introducing such evidence, which is directed to questions of fact, and
the district court will be entitled to deference regarding not only the
ultimate decision but also the credibility of contending expert witnesses.
Thus, the prudent course is to consider all references not to be cumulative
unless they are different versions of the same reference (e.g., a PCT/WIPO
published application and its counterpart EPO publication of the same
application).
With regard to the second prong of the Therasense test, intent to
deceive, the Federal Circuit upheld (and the Supreme Court will not
disturb) the district court’s drawing of an adverse inference based on the
litigation misconduct catalogued by the district court in its opinion as not
being an abuse of discretion. 349 The panel majority’s decision was
supported by Regeneron’s failure to “meaningfully dispute any of the

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1355.
Id.
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https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss3/2

52

Noonan and Torrance: Top Biotechnology Patent Law Cases

2018]

TOP BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW CASES 2018

689

factual findings underlying the district court’s decision,” 350 which
included improperly withholding and citing on privilege logs documents
clearly not privileged (such as experimental data); withholding as
privileged information where the privilege had been waived; and
withholding evidence of patent prosecution counsels’ reasoning and state
of mind relevant to whether counsel had an intent to deceive. 351 The latter
included, inter alia, the following cited in the Court’s opinion:

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
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•

I firmly believed—and still believe today—that Brüggemann,
Taki, Zou and Wood were not material to patentability because
they were substantially different from the mice claimed in the
‘176 application . . . and were cumulative of other information
before the Patent Examiner. 352

•

[Counsel’s] description of his understanding of what a
materiality analysis for inequitable conduct involves:
“Regardless of whether I satisfied the minimum requirements
of being an ordinary skilled artisan, I felt comfortable
evaluating the art from that perspective during the prosecution
of the ‘176 application. When I did have questions, however, I
did not hesitate to reach out to those with more experience and
knowledge. 353

•

I routinely made Regeneron inventors aware of the foregoing
obligations when providing them with invention
declarations. 354

•

With regard to Brüggemann and Zou, “I was generally familiar
with the subject matter of those two references . . . [a]t no time
did I consider these references to be material to patentability to
the claims pending in the ‘176.” 355

•

Because of this experience [prosecuting the ‘176 application as
well as the ‘287 Patent], I was readily familiar with both prior
art that was before the Examiner in the ‘176 application and the
pending claims of the ‘176 application. 356

Id.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1360 (alteration in original).
Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1360 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1360–61
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I viewed the analysis [relating to the Withheld References] as
straightforward.” 357“I concluded that [the Withheld
References], alone or combined with other prior art of which I
was aware, were cumulative of information already before the
Examiner. Furthermore, it was my view that the skilled artisan
would not have viewed them as teaching the reverse chimeric
inventions that the Examiner had allowed in the ‘176
application. 358

The tragedy for the patent prosecutors in this case is that this
evidence not considered by the district court is the kind of evidence those
prosecutors believed they would be able to present at trial, and that the
contemporaneous record provided powerfully-exculpatory evidence
regarding their subjective intent at the time they made the decision not to
submit the references. Thus, the fourth lesson is: a patent prosecutor
cannot have any reasonable basis for believing that they will have an
absolute right, protected by due process, to present the evidence of their
actual intent as a defense to an inequitable conduct charge. The extent to
which the purported litigation misconduct deserved the sanction of an
adverse inference is not the issue; what is important it that whether a
patent prosecutor is exposed to an inequitable conduct determination can
be, under the precedent established in this case, totally devoid of any
deceptive intent on their part, no matter what evidence the prosecutor may
have that would excuse a failure to disclose material prior art.
The Supreme Court’s decision not to review this case leaves a split
between this decision and a pre-Therasense case, Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn
Design Systems, Inc., 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cited by Judge
Newman in her dissent. 359 In that case, according to Judge Newman, “we
held that courts may not punish a party’s post-prosecution misconduct by
declaring the patent unenforceable” and cited multiple cases applying the
principle that litigation misconduct can bar a litigant but does not render
a patent unenforceable. 360 Yet that is what happened here, and thus any
comfort Therasense may have given the patent bar regarding the need for
evidence, inferential or otherwise, of a patent prosecutor’s intent to
deceive, is greatly diminished by this decision.
Finally, because intent to deceive is personal (insofar as it applies
only to those individuals who have a Rule 56 duty to disclose), it seems
357. Id. at 1361.
358. Id.
359. See Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1365–74 (Newman, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 1366 (citing Hazel–Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford–Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944),
overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18 (1976)).
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inequitable to draw such an inference against the attorneys who
prosecuted the ‘018 patent based on the conduct (bad or just
misunderstood) of litigation counsel who did not have a Rule 56 duty of
candor and were not involved in prosecuting the ‘018 patent to allowance.
Inequitable conduct based on a practitioner’s intent to deceive is a serious
allegation having deleterious consequences to a patent prosecutor’s
reputation and can also have as negative repercussions an ethics inquiry
by the Patent Office’s disciplinary officials. Accordingly, it is not
unreasonable for patent prosecutors to be placed in such jeopardy solely
due to their own mis- or mal-feasance, rather than to be at the whim of
conduct by litigation counsel taken for strategic reasons at trial (as the
district court’s decision and Federal Circuit opinion alleged here) that are
found to be subject to sanction. The decision also perhaps raises questions
of whether improperly rendering a patent unenforceable for inequitable
conduct by a misapplication of the Therasense standard may amount to a
14th Amendment violation for taking property rights without due process.
These issues were not enough for the Court to consider them worthy of its
review, and thus remain somewhat uncertain.
J.

Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp. (2017) (Decision by Justice
Sotomayor, joined by Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan,
Kennedy, Thomas; Concurrence by Justice Alito)

The Supreme Court in this case decided whether the supply of a
single component of a multi-component invention for combination abroad
violates 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). 361
The patent-in-suit, known as the Tautz patent and exclusively
licensed by Promega Corporation, claims a toolkit for genetic testing by
DNA amplification. 362 There are five components to the patent: “(1) a
mixture of primers that mark the part of the DNA strand to be copied; (2)
nucleotides for forming replicated strands of DNA; (3) an enzyme known
as Taq polymerase; (4) a buffer solution for the amplification; and (5)
control DNA.” 363 The patent was sublicensed to Life Technologies by
Promega to manufacture and sell the toolkits worldwide.364 Life
Technologies manufactured all components except the Taq polymerase in
the United Kingdom; the polymerase was manufactured in the United

361.
362.
363.
364.
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States. 365 The polymerase was then shipped to the U.K. to be combined
with the other four components. 366 Promega sued Life Technologies
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), which prohibits supply of all or a
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention for
combination abroad. 367 The jury in the district court found that Life
Technologies willfully infringed the patent, and the district court granted
Life Technologies motion for judgment as a matter of law. 368 The court
agreed with Life Technologies that “all or a substantial portion” of an
invention does not encompass the supply of a single component. 369 The
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that
“substantial” means “important”, and the Taq polymerase is an essential
component for the invention. 370 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
question was “whether the supply of a single component of a
multicomponent invention is an infringing act under U.S.C. §
271(f)(1).” 371
The Court began its analysis by determining whether the use of the
term “substantial” refers to a qualitative or quantitative measurement. 372
The statute does not provide a definition for the term, and the plain
meaning of the term is ambiguous without context. 373 The Court construed
the statute to mean that in context the phrase “all or a substantial portion”
points toward a quantitative meaning. 374 “Portion” and “all” have
quantitative meanings, and the Court provided several dictionary
definitions for these terms. 375 Additionally, the fact that the phrase
“substantial portion” is modified by “of the components of a patented
invention” supported a quantitative interpretation in the Court’s view. 376
Therefore, the Court concluded that the text of the statute is correctly
interpreted quantitatively. 377 The Court declined to adopt an interpretation
that would require both quantitative and qualitative analyses. 378 A
qualitative analysis would require determining which components of the
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id.
Id.
Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2010).
Life Techs. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 739.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Life Techs. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 739.
Id.
Id. at 740.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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invention are more important than the others. 379 This complicates the duty
of the factfinder due to its subjectivity, and is not supported by the text of
the statute. 380
Next, the Court determined “whether, as a matter of law, a single
component can ever constitute a ‘substantial portion’ so as to trigger
liability under §271(f)(1).” 381 The text of the statute consistently uses the
term “components” in the plural when discussing the supply of a
substantial number of components. 382 The Court compared the section to
§271(f)(2), which refers to “any component” in the singular. 383 The
Federal Circuit acknowledged that the two provisions encompass different
scenarios, and the Supreme Court agreed. 384 However, the Supreme Court
disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that §271(f)(1) covers any
single component. 385 The Supreme Court concluded that “component” is
meant to reference a single component and “components” is meant to
reference many components. 386 Due to this reading, the Court held that
“all or a substantial portion” of a multicomponent invention cannot be a
single component. 387 The Court did not attempt to define how many
components in a multicomponent invention would count as “all or a
substantial portion.” 388
Based on this construction of the statutory language, the Supreme
Court reversed the ruling of the Federal Circuit and remanded for further
proceedings. 389 The immediate consequence of this decision is likely to
be an increase in otherwise infringing activities abroad, wherein staple
components are produced outside the U.S. and more complex or
sophisticated components are made at home, thereby disadvantaging
biotechnology or pharmaceutical patentees who manufacture or assemble
their products in the U.S. in favor of competitors who do so overseas.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Several implications for patent law doctrine, as applied to
biotechnology, emerge from the top ten judicial decisions surveyed above.
379.
380.
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383.
384.
385.
386.
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389.
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Although only the passage of time and application by the courts will
reveal the full topography of these implications, several lessons may
already be drawn.
A.

Obviousness

The Acorda decision suggests that the Federal Circuit is likely to
continue a fairly broad interpretation of nonobviousness doctrine. This
includes allowing challengers of patent validity to infer a generous
amount of information from prior art references, and to combine such
information relatively easily in order to made successful showings of
nonobviousness. In particular, the existing of a blocking patent seems
likely to make reliance on secondary indications of nonobviousness more
difficult, leading to more invalidity findings.
B.

Statutory Subject Matter

The Berkheimer decision appears to herald a change in direction for
§101 subject matter doctrine. Here, the court suggested that a patentee or
patent applicant may have an heretofore unavailable opportunity to rebut
findings of invalidity due to unpatentable subject matter. Under
Berkheimer, facts matter in a § 101 analysis and disputed facts can may
make it more difficult to invalidate patents on the pleadings, as well as at
the summary judgment stage.
C.

Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Patent Shield

The issue of whether Native American tribes may use their tribal
sovereign immunity to prevent challenges to their patents’ validity may
ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court. In the meantime, however,
the Federal Circuit has ruled that tribal sovereign immunity may not shield
tribe-owned patents from invalidity proceedings like IPRs, and the
Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari in the first case squarely
to present it with this issue.
D.

DNA Interference

Whoever ultimately owns patents successfully claiming the
application of the CRISPR/Cas9 (and other forms of Cas) in mammals is
likely to benefit from a windfall on the order of magnitude of the PCR
patent estate in the 1980s. Thus far, it appears that the Broad Institute (and
co-assignees), and its now-famous biologist, Feng Zhang, will control
fundamental patents claiming uses of CRISPR/Cas9 in mammals and
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other eukaryotes, and will be big players in the gene editing stakes
alongside the University of California/Berkeley (and co-assignees) and its
own celebrity biologist, Jennifer Doudna.
E.

Continued viability of the PTAB and IPR

The Supreme Court, in Oil States, decided that the Constitution does
not prohibit the Patent Office from resolving issues of validity post
issuance outside of an Article III Court. Whether one sees the PTAB as a
patent death court or a judicious and efficient gatekeeper of patent quality,
it now appears that IPRs are here to stay, at least in the medium term. They
are likely to continue to play an outsized role in testing and invalidating
biotechnology patents.
F.

Scope of PTAB Institutions and Written Decisions

In light of the resilience of IPRs, the Supreme Court, in SAS Institute,
also decided that the PTAB would have to provide written reasons for the
decisions they make. This burden will add to the workload of
administrative patent judges, but should also help to clarify the procedures
and arguments the PTAB use in this innovative, relatively inexpensive,
and quite rapid proceeding.
G.

Written Description of Antibodies

In Amgen, the Federal Circuit harmonized the application of the
written description requirement as applied to antibody claims with the
manner in which it is applied to other biotechnological inventions, such
as nucleotide sequences. This seems to bring antibody inventions into the
fold of the generally stricter written description requirement that has been
applied to biotechnology inventions for several decades.
H.

BPCIA implementation

The Supreme Court’s put its imprimatur on Sandoz’s interpretation
of the BPCIA not to require a biosimilars applicant to submit to the
reference product sponsor its application and any manufacturing
information, despite the usually mandatory “shall” in the express language
of the statute (42 U.S.C. §262(k)(2)). This decision has disrupted patent
litigation under the Act to an extent that only Congress can repair.
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The Inequitable Road to Inequitable Conduct

The Regeneron denial of certiorari provides a warning to those
involved in prosecuting patents to be extremely careful in how they act
and what prior art reference they cite to the examiner. Inequitable conduct
in the antibody context appears to be relatively easy to demonstrate. For
example, patent attorneys would be advised to err on the side of
submitting more prior art, rather than less, in order to maximize the
probability that a court will not find that any prior art references had been
impermissibly withheld from the Patent Office. Abundance of
prosecutorial caution may increase the volume of prior art examiners need
to consider, with potential consequences for prosecution timing and Patent
Office backlogs.
J.

Infringement Via Component Sales

The Supreme Court used the Life Techs decision to interpret the
meaning of a “substantial portion” of a claimed invention. It clarified that
the approach should rely on quantitative, not qualitative, interpretation to
determine whether or not patent infringement has occurred. The result is
an inquiry into whether that number constitutes a substantial portion of a
claimed invention. The Supreme Court held that a single component, as a
matter of law, cannot constitute a “substantial portion” of a
multicomponent invention. Overseas biotechnology manufacturing and
assembly of products is likely to benefit.
K.

Issues on the Horizon

Biotechnology shows no signs of slowing down. Quite to the
contrary, the pace of innovation in the field, encompassing myriad new
approaches to therapeutics, diagnostics, and even human enhancement,
appears to be accelerating, diversifying, and increasingly affecting people
as part of their ordinary lives. Biotechnology patent law will have to try
to keep pace, with many significant judicial decisions expected in the
future. It seems likely that biotechnology and the law of biotechnological
patents will continue to provoke robust interest and heated controversy.
However, discussion of these developments will have to await the
“BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW 2019 REVIEW.”
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